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After World War II the revival o f  the spirit of nationalism led 
to the emergence of many new states. Freed from the colonial domination , 
the new states were keenly int.erested in developing their societies as 
fast as possible. Many problems stand in the way o f  development. These 
problems are the problems of stability, unity, integration and socio-
economic problems. 
This study is concerned about the problems of political develop-
ment in Bangladesh , which came into existence in 1971 , as a result of the 
problems o f  of national integration in Pakistan. This study identifies 
some problems which stand in the way of political development in Bangla-
desh. These problems are: (1) the problems o f  integration, (2) the 
problems of unity and stability, (3) the lack of well-organized political 
parties, (4) the problems of bureaucracy, and (5) socio-economic problems. 
After the creation of Bangladesh it was assumed that there would 
be no problem of integration in Bangladesh. But an analysis o f  the poli-
tical situations will show that problems of integration still remain , 
though in different character, such as the lack of integration between 
' 
the elites and the mass, the lack of integrative ideology, the separa-
tist tendency in the tribal people, etc. Absence of stability is creating 
problems in the effective undertaking o f  any developmental plan. The chief 
causes of instability are: factionalism, frustration of the people, threat 
of India , loss of charisma, etc . Too many political parties with too many 
ideologies stand in the way of creating a stable government. The parties 
do not have any organizational basis , and are based on the personality of 
the leader. The parties are not effective in aggregating the peoples' 
demands and grievances. The lack of balance in the role of the bureaucracy 
2 
is also a problem. On the one hand, if the bureaucrats are given more 
power, they hinder the growth of political institutions . On the other 
hand, if they are given less p�wer, they play an inactive role hindering 
the execution of policies. Bangladesh suffers from both the problems of 
bureaucracy. 
The most pre-dominant problems which hamper political development 
in Bangladesh are socio-economic problems. The population problem, food 
problem, and unemployment create mass frustrations causing instability 
and disunity within the country. The attachment to the traditional values 
hinders the way of change. This study analyzes in detail all these prob­
lems and how they stand in the way of political development. 
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.CHAPTER I 
PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH 
Introduction 
After World War II the revival of the spirit of nationalism led 
to the emergence of many new states. Freed from the colonial domination 
the new states were keenly interested in developing their societies as· 
quickly as possible. Many problems stand in the way of developmen t .  The 
most formidable problems of political development are the problems of 
stability , unity, integration and socio-economic problems of development .  
In this study, we will try to identify the problems of political 
development in Bangladesh. Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan from 1947 
to 1971 . In 1947, British India was given independence with the creation 
of Pakistan, which consisted of West Pakistan and Bangladesh . 
' 
Bangladesh came into existence through succession from Pakistan. The 
study of Bangladesh marks a new trend in the politics of the developing 
areas. 
As a new-born country, it is filled with many problems of a poli-
tical, social and economic nature. This study will analyze the political 
and socio-economic problems of Bangladesh by describing the problems and 
analyzing their causes. 
Hopefully-, this study will serve as a useful guide to understanding 
the problems of an emerging country. Political development is the chief 
1 
concern of the new states of Asia and Africa. But an analysis of the 
politics of the developing areas will show that many problems stand in 
the way of political development .  The goals of political development 
2 
is very much frustrated by the problems of stability, unity and socio­
economic problems. By studying this, we can get an idea of the problems 
facing a new state . 
This study will be helpful for understanding the problems of poli­
tical integration , stability and economic development .  The real problem 
of political development is economic. The greatest skill is dependent on 
the solution of economic problems. Though the developing countries are 
often led by a charismatic leader, unless he can resolve economic problems 
he is bound to fade away very soon. If these problems are not solved, 
people ·rise in revolution, which leads to political instability, disunity 
and disintegration. 
Meaning of Political Development 
The term "political development" is a very elusive concept .  There 
is no consensus among the political scientists regarding the concept of 
political development. Political development is termed as change, but 
change has taken place in a variety of ways. Moreover, the concept of 
political development is very transitory in character. What was regarded 
a s  political development in the 1960' s is regarded as politi�ally under­
developed in the 1970 ' s. As such the conception of political development 
is fast changing. Rostow and L. Pye fashion their conception of "political 
development" around the notion of national political unity and broadening 
base of political participation. 1 Pye , in addition to emphasizing the 
need for stregnthening of national interests at the expense of parochial 
concerns at the local or regional leve l ,  also argues that there ought to 
3 
be effective coordination between administrative and political groups and 
institutions which are very weak and not very articulate . 
E. E. Hegen, in exploring the possibilities for a framework for 
analyzing economic and political development takes account of "deep seated 
resistence to social change and of the need for changing some rather basic 
2 
attitudes . 11 He speaks �f J::esistence, 'that is ·to say, t·r�ditional values 
and ideas that stand fn,the way of any �hange towards·development . Hegen 
is a sociologist. So, he analyz�s�political development from.th� point of 
social value , : .nort.n� ,·;�t;c . 
. 
Gabriel Almond defined political development as "the acquisition 
by a political system of a new capability in the sense of a specialized 
role structure and differentiated orientations,  which together give a 
political system the possibility of responding efficientiy and more or 
3 He speaks of four cap­less autonomously to a new range of problem s . " ,  
abilities for a politically developed society: (1) integrative capability , 
i . e . , the creation of national unity and centralized bureaucracy , (2) inter-
national accommodative capability, i . e . ,  ability to engage in international 
contacts of various governments ,  (3) participation capability, i . e . , crea-
tion of a political culture of civic obligation and of a democratic poli-
1Alfred Diamond , "Political Development: Appt:oaches to Theory 
and Strategy ," New York: McGraw-Hil l  Book Company , 1966, p .  20 . 
2 Ibid . ,  p .  21. 
3Ibid. 
4 
tical structure, and (4) welfare or distributive capability , i . e., wide-
spread d issemination of welfare standards and accommodation between 
political social structure. 
Welch defines political development as "the development of an 
institutional framework that ·is  sufficiently flexible and powerful to 
4 
meet the demands placed upon it . "  In short,  the government must be 
fully capable of performing a wide variety of duties. Its capabilities 
must increase so that change can be accommodated within political chan-
nels. Political modernization is linked with economic growth and with 
social and psychological changes for the obvious reason that the capacity 
of a government to deal with demands is affected by economic an9 cultural 
factors. 
The process of political modernization has three characteristics: 
( 1 )  an increased centralization of power in the state coupled with the 
weakening of traditional sources of authority, (2) the differentiation 
and specificity of political institutions, and (3) increased popular parti-
cipation in politics and greater identification of individuals with the 
• 
political system as a whole. 
In a more analytical way Huntington states that four characteris-
tics of political development are referred to most commonly: ( 1 )  ration-
alization, (2) national integration, (3) democratization, and (4) partici-
pation. Paekenham takes a functional view of moderization and with some 
qualifications, identifies political development with it. Political 
4claude E. Welch, Political Moderization: A Reader in Comparative 
Political Change (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc . , 1969), p. 7 .  
development according to him "is the will and the capacity to cope with 
and generate cont inuing transformation toward modernization while main­
taining basic ind ividual freedom . 11
5 
5 
All these definitions reflect the same thing of political develop-
ment . "The popular idea of a developed country is one that is able to pro-
vide its c itizens with goods and services roughly equivalent to the highest 
level of goods and services available in any country at that time.116 
Indices of development range from per capita income through various ratios 
of fuel consumption, railroads, telephones, televis ion sets, teacher s ,  stu-
dents, l iteracy and death. 
Indices of political development are less tangible and convenient . 
Perhaps the best way to approach polit ical development is in t erms of the 
role the political system must play if the society as a whole is to enjoy 
the standard of living and other benefits generally associated with a 
modern industrialized society. Monte Palmer mentioned three areas for 
character izing political development. First, the political system must be 
in a position to effectively control the popul�tion and resources of the 
country. Second , the polit ical system in developing areas must increasingly 
bear responsibility for modernizat ion of their state's human and mater ial 
resources . The economic and social problems facing the developing areas 
are beyond the point at which private enterprise is willing to provide 
�Von Der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc . ,  1969), p. 6.  
6Gerald A.  Regen, The Politics of Underdevelopment (New York: St.  
Martin!s ·Press,  1974 ) ,  pp.  1-2. 
adequate solutions. Third, the political sys tem must successfully accom-
modate the demands occasioned by economic and social change without sur-
rendering its role of control and mobilization. Too frequently developing 
areas have struggled to attain a substantial record of economic growth 
only to see their economies stagnate because of their inability to cope 
with the conflict and social d isorganization precip itated thereby . A 
sys tem that cannot cope with the changes that it generates cannot be con-
sidered politically developed. 
We can define a politically developed society as one which has 
stability, orderly ways of change, effectiveness, higher rate of economic 
growth, ins titutionalized institutions,  groups with fractional speciali-
zation, unity and consensus.in its fundamental ways and goals, legitimacy 
of its government, popular participation balance between different sectors 
of the society. 
Problems 
• 
Political development has become the chief concern of the new 
states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. But political development creates 
in its wake a lot of problems. The process of modernization involves change 
in the structure of society in its attitudinal framework and in its capa-
city to respond effec tively to the problems imposed upon the sys tem. It 
involves the shift from ·a predominantly rural agricultural soc iety to an 
increasingly urban, industrial society characterized by a cash and market 
economy, occupational differentiation, high literacy and media access. 
The parochial world of tradition is penetrated by mass support and communi-
7 
cations facilities . The ascriptive determination of status by b irth gives 
way to achievement orientations. The identity horizon of the ind ividual 
expands beyond the particularistic loyalties of family , village and tribe 
to include increasingly universal and secular values. 
The process of change creates new problems which are difficult for 
the political sys tem to cope with. The character and direction of change 
will be the product of a dialectical interaction between tradition and 
modernity as each inf iltrates and transforms the other. The relationship 
between tradition and modernity, the degree to which tradition is accommo-
dated in the process of change, the ways it responds to the challenge of 
modernization , is a critical determinant of s tability and development. 
The forces of tradition may buy short term stability at the price of revo-
lution but a failure to accept the context of tradition, to use traditional 
structures as the vehicles of change may so undermine stability as to pre-
vent the development of the institutional capacity to fulfill the promise 
of transformation. 
"The process of change will give rise to new political demands 
which may strain the l imited capacity of the sys tem that institutionaliza-
tion becomes increasingly difficult as partic ipation expands. The process 
of modernization may unleash a revolution of rising frustrations as the 
7 
gap widens between asp irations and achievements." Regional linguistic 
and cultural minorities may become more self-conscious and as primoridal 
identifications are injected into political life, traditional communities 
7Helio Jaquaribe, Political Development: A General Theory and 
a Latin American Case Study (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973) , 
p .  207. 
B 
may take on the modern form of tribe and associations or of movements 
advocating separatism or linguistic nationalism. Conflict increases as 
new groups become participants but if they lack the minimum consensus 
necessary for the ordered resolution of conflict, the political system 
may be unable to accommodate expanded participation by means of its insti-
tutions. 
The primary problem of politics writes Samuel P .  Huntington "is 
the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and 
. 8 economic change . "  The stability and development of any political system 
depends on the relationship between political institutionalization and 
political participation. As partlc�p at·ion expands, the capacity of the 
political institutions to absorb change must also increase if stability 
is to be maintained. The elites of the·new states stimulate the formation 
of demands in the process of inducing social change. Development programs 
may seek to create felt needs within one traditional society in order to 
facilitate innovation, but in an environment of scarcity, resources are 
limited and the system will be most responsive to those commanding politi-
' 
cal capital, wealth , status, votes. Traditional elites may be reinforced 
to ensure stability and to suppress widening popular involvement. Repres-
sive rule s upplants democratic response in the name of order, however, 
rather than through higher levels of institutionalization in response to 
expanding participation may be the harbinger of chaos.  
Development defined as increasing institutionalization in response 
to expanding participation may require a dynamic gap between the two vari-
ables . With participat ion somewhat beyond the capacity of the instit utions 
81bid. , p .  195. 
9 
to respond, the attempt to close the gap serves as the stimulus to higher 
levels of institutionalization. The interaction between institutionali-
zation and participation betw;een order and re.sponse thus involv�s a 
staggered process of development as each reacts to the other . Beyond a 
critical range, however, an imbalance may be increasingly difficult to 
correct. Over-ins titutionalization is conducive to the establishment of 
repressive order; participation far beyond institutional capacity may 
foster unacceptable instability and political decay. 
In the process of change there arises the problem of cultural lag. 
In s ituations of rapid change, the harmony between structure and attitudes 
that exists in traditional societies is replaced by discontinuity or dis-
harmony referred to as cultural lag. "The discontinuities faced by changing 
societies go far beyond cultural lag. There are different sources of these 
discontinuities . 119 First, different segments of the population are sub-
jected to differ ing pressures for change.  These pressures are intense in 
urban areas . Discontinuous rates of change,  in turn, result in discon-
tinuous att itudes, loyalties, value. expe.ctat:iQn among v�r'lous poimlat:(.Qn 
' 
segments, Such. d i.scontinu:lties pose. one. of the. Jll&jor iJl}ped!ments to poli..� 
tical deve.lopment . 
S e.cond , d iscontinuities occur b e.cause d iff e.rent groups witlrln a 
state. are. more prone to change than others . Based on his study of Uganda , 
David Apter suggests that complex or highly differentiated tribes, such. as 
the. Buganda, are. better able to absorb �nd accommodate change inputs than 
9Monte J:>aimer, The Dilemmas of Political Deve.lopment : An Intro­
duction to the Politics of the Developing Areas (Illinois : F. E. Peacock 
Publishers, Inc . ,  1973) , p .  1 .  
their poorly differentiated counterparts. In the case of the former, 
tribal loyalties and belief systems are left very much intact. In the 
latter, pressures for change result in structural breakdown and in the 
concomitant disruption of the individual's values and his attitudes 
toward change. 
1 0  
Third, discontinuities in attitudes and loyaltj\patterns result 
from the variety of individual responses to the conflicts and ambiguities 
characteristic of rapidly changing environments. One response to this 
dilemma has been to minimize insecurity by withdrawal and non-involvement. 
Another response is the proliferation of religious and other tradition­
oriented voluntary associations designed to compensate for the erosion of 
traditional beliefs. A related response has been to find security or 
mobility via the path of total commitment to future-oriented nationalist, 
socialist or communist movements. These and similar responses further 
contribute to the heterogeneity of values and loyalties with which poli­
tical leaders in developing states must cope. 
Another problem is that the social control mechanisms are breaking 
down faster than they can be replaced by modern control techniques. 
Fifth, the erosion of traditional social structures and increased 
mobility associated with accelerated change means that increasingly smaller 
segments of the population are becoming predisposed toward, and available 
for recruitment into various political movements. If political stability 
is to be found, this increased politicization of the masses must be dir­
ected toward identification with the dominant regime and its values. 
Another problem is the new states are poorly educated. There is 
imperfect information about the universe. The values of the ga�e-role 
11 
definitions and expectations about the behavior of others are poorly 
defined and frequently subj ect to change. Economic security is minimal . 
The conflicting demands of political, economic , ethnic' and religi.ous 
groups are f requently difficult to r econcile. 
The bureaucracies are beset by problems of nepotism, by rigidity 
and lack of innovation b ehavior and by a deficient s ense of social respon-
sibility. Industrial workers are lazy, non-innovative, sluggish, peasant-
oriented, undisciplined , unproductive, and subject to frequent absenteeism. 
"The image of rising expectation creates problems for political 
d evelopment. The modern government has to mobilize the resources of the 
country for undertaking large scale d evelopment programs . In order to 
satisfy the popular demands the modernizing r egimes have to choose between 
conspicuous spending for welfare-type proj ects on one hand and long range 
10 
infra-structure industrial d evelopment on the other . "  The former means 
sport palaces, opera houses, cradle to grave s ecurity programs , palatial 
buildings, hero statues and short run measures designed to create or 
reinforce the legitimacy of a r egion. The latter may often disrupt normal 
consumption patterns by necessitating austerity programs and import, export 
and currency r estrictions . The long range development programs may d elay 
prof its that do little to gratify the i mmediate needs of the population 
or to counter promises of immediate gratification offered by opposition 
group s .  
1 0  . 
Robert L. Hargrave, Jr . ,  India Government and Politics in a 
Developing Nation (New York: Harcourt,  Brace and World , Inc . ,  1970), p .  4 .  
1 2  
As regimes or their predecessors opt for short-run conspicuous 
spending, vital capital resources are diverted from infra-structure 
development essential for long-range economic development and mass 
demands and expectations are stimulated. The more mass demands are 
aroused the more difficult the imposition of austerity and other restric-
tive measures becomes and the greater the temptation to embark upon an 
escalating cycle of promises and conspicuous programs which leave basic 
economic and social problems unresolved. The growing problems lead to 
the assumption of power by the military which also suffers from faction-
alization resulting from value discontinuities and personality conflicts. 
Because of more problems, control becomes the chief concern of the modern-
izing society, which compels the modern regimes to divert key develop-
mental resources toward the control function, thereby crippling their 
ability to achieve their modernization goals. Political instability 
leads to severe disruption in the planning, ·promUl:·gat·ion and application 
of development programs; to decreased confidence in the government; to 
the increased unwillingness of private investors to invest in the long-
, 
range projects; to the postponement of solutions to major problems; and 
to the stimulation of competitive bidding among elites, thereby increasing 
mass expectations and demands. 
Monte Palmer speaks of different problems of political develop-
1 1  ment. First, the severe heterogeneity of political attitudes and values 
and the inability of most governmental institutions to meet the popular 
demands. There is much opposition to the regimes. 
11 
Monte Palmer, ££.• cit. , p. 62.  
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Second, there is the problem of the heterogeneity in the politi-
cal values of the major political elites, i.e., those who through legal 
or extra-legal means are in a position to either control or heavily 
influence government policies. Because of the difference of values of 
the political elites, there will be no consistency in the developmental 
programs and policies. 
Third, bureaucracies of developing areas are seldom perceived as 
impartial by incoming regimes, particularly where value orientations 
differ markedly from one regime to the next. As a result, regimes are 
prone to interfere in the bureaucracy in an effort to reward their own 
supporters and to eliminate individuals perceived as hostile. The result 
of this interference is that the planning, implementing and coordinating 
of development projects lacks continuity and is subject to frequent and 
severe disruptions. Also, the lack of sufficient insulation from the 
arena of political conflict reduces the willingness of administrators to 
take the initiative necessary for the ongoing operation of the government 
for fear of ·retribution. 
Peter H .  Merkl mentions different problems of political develop-
ment such as: 
1. Problems of Unity and Consensus: The problems of 
unity and consensus are partly geographical and 
partly social. The problems of nation-building 
and economic development are greatly complicated 
where there are geographical barriers as the 
separateness of East and West Pakistan or the 
islands of Indonesia. There is also social 
differences based on language, ethinicity, blood, 
which stand in the way of unification. Due to the 
disunity the basic consensus on the form of govern­
ment, the roles of the political process, coDllllon 
concepts of justice or day by day policies at home 
and abroad. are·,,not esta.b.lishe'i:J!.': ·�i:��r�. i� ·.a��ays 
bitterness in .. the .. �ocj.C!"� �nd economic field. · 
2. Problems of Stability and Effectiveness: The 
developing countries are beset with the problem 
of stability atid effectiveness. There is no 
orderly change in government. The government 
does not have the capacity to solve the ever­
increasing problems. 
3. Problems of Communication Between Leadership and 
the Masses: Prior to independence, the masses 
are united with the leadership on the question of 
independence. But after the independence, when 
practical problems confront the new states, there 
is the necessity of established channels, organs 
of public opinion or interest groups that can 
transmit demands and grievances. There is a.con­
siderable gulf socially and intellectually between 
the modernizing urban elite from which the leaders 
spring and the illiterate peasant masses and 
migrants to the city. These two groups are hardly 
able to conununicate with each other and of ten lack 
appreciation of the crucial �portance of communica­
tion. 
4. Problems of Lagging Interest Articulation: Due to 
the lack of organization, the different groups in 
the developing countries very of ten spur revolution 
which disturbs the stability and effectiveness of 
the government. The operation of political parties 
may resemble a conspirational net of clandestine 
groups or a social mass movement and lack many of 
the attributes typical of a more advanced stage. 
5. Psychological Problems: The, traditional outlook and 
way of life also stand in the way of change and 
development.12 
These, in general, are the problems of political development. 
Methodology 
14 
There are various approaches to the study of political development 
such. as historical survey, structural-functional system analysis, elite 
theory, group theory, games, conununications, etc. 
12 Peter H. Merkl, Political Continuity and Change (New
.
York: 
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), pp. 359-360. 
15 
But political development is a very elusive concept. It includes 
all phases of life. It is not a·promiseJto study all phases of life 
related to political development by a single approach. 
The politics of the developing areas are in the transitional 
stage. They are neither modern nor traditional. They are midway between 
traditional and modern elements. In most developing soci�ties,the formal 
structures of government were arbitrarily introduced from abroad during 
the colonial period and became autonomous forces within the society. 
There is lack of well-institutionalized social and economic interest 
groups in many developing societies which also brings into question the 
roles of different classes of individuals. The institutions are very much 
diffused. As such it is not possible to distinguish between different 
institutions on the basis of roles. The lack of institutionalized groups 
creates a ban on the free interplay between demands, supports, and deci­
sions which is emph&sized by David Easton. 
The elite character is also changing very fast. Different kinds 
of elite came in the political scene of Bangladesh. Moreover, different 
circumstances lead to different kinds of elites. In order to understand 
problems of political development we have to understand the different cir­
cumstances that led to the coming up of different kinds of leaders. 
There is also the need for new kinds of data. In the developed 
society it is possible to accumulate data. Government agencies, the mass 
media, popular authors and private industry employ many of the categories 
the political scientists utilizes and thus gathers information that is 
useful for study. "But in the developing countries, there is usually 
little in the way of acceptable data available on even the most conven-
16 
tional matters, and frequently nothing at all has been collected on sub-
13 
jects of interest for the innovative researcher." 
There is a lack of consensus among the people on the fundamental 
question of life. There exists ambivalence in the public mind. For the 
researcher these features of developing political systems call for a greater 
than ordinary problem of the relationships between individual experience 
and collective action. The task of measuring strength of opinion becomes 
extremely complex. Also, in such systems there is a greater need for con-
cern with �.questions about the motivation of actors and what it is that 
compels them to take the positions they do from time to time. 
In order to appreciate fully the human problems which can arise 
from profound cultural change, it is necessary to place the problems of 
individual psychology within the broader contact of social history. 
Research based upon intensive interviewing and the analysis of life 
histories is necessary in order to identify and characterize different 
patterns of individual reaction. 
A common hallmark of all developing systems is the gulf between 
the ruling few and the mass of the population. In these··kind ·of bifurcated 
societies there is of ten a profound problem of communication between the 
mass and the elite. As such, it is difficult for the communication theory 
to study the problem of the developing countries. This problem of the gap 
between the elite and the mass offers a wide range of challenging research 
possibilities. One of the most important indicators of the probable pat-
tern of national development is to be found in the particular manner in 
13 Lucian W. Pye, "The Developing Areas: Problems for Research,'' 
Robert E. Ward (ed.), Studying Politics Abroad (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company, 1964), p. 24. 
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which mediation between elite and mass is being strengthened. This funda-
mental problem of the gap between rulers and citizens suggests the great 
importance of more research into the dynamics of pol·itical parties and 
the problems of building voluntary associations. 
The elites in the developing societies comprise an extraordinarily 
small group of men. The fact that the leaders belong to an intimate and 
restricted world places many serious limits on the possibilities of poli-
tics. The existence of a closed polity.:·-..fueans. that personality becomes 
a desirable factor in determining the course of political energy. This 
characteristic of develpping political systems can pose some extremely 
difficult problems for the researcher. Instead of dealing with formal 
issues and matters of political doctrine the analyst must turn his atten-
tion to the political style of actors and the spirit which they conduct 
their relations with each other. We are to take into account the dis-
proportionate influence that the personality of a single leader may have 
on national political life. In most developing societies, especially in 
Bangladesh, there is much room for general studies of the social and eco-
' 
nomic groups which are politically important or which appear politically 
significant. For many years there has been a need for more systematic 
studies of such groups as students, intellectuals, journalists, business 
communities, labor unions and even the more formally established organi-
zations such as the army or the civil service. We are t.a . .-know .  how. leaders 
are recruited. Has there been any change over time in the importance and 
the proper position of the different groups? 
Such problems force the political scientists to engage in intensive 
sociological and economic analysis. In order to discuss the pro�pects of 
different potential leadership elements it is necessary to understand 
the prospects of fundamental economic and sociological change. 
18 
Due to these problems; the analytic descriptive method will be 
useful for understanding the problems of political development in Bangla­
desh which have the similar characteristics of the developing countries 
of the world . The analytic descriptive method will try to take into 
account historical survey, the nature of the elite, group dynamics ,  socio­
economic changes.and all other factions of the society . 
Statement of Hypotheses 
First, Bangladesh is like the other developing countries of the 
world striving for political development. The leaders and the people a�e 
eager to achieve political development as fast as possible. After the 
birth of Bangladesh every political scientist and leader of Bangladesh 
thought there would be no more problems of integration as it existed in 
Pakistan until 1 97 1 .  But still the problem o f  integration is not solved. 
Bangladesh is still suffering from the problems of integration, hindering 
political development . 
Second , like the other countries of Asia and Africa, Bangladesh 
is faced with the' problem of stability. Within the span of a few years 
there has been many ups and downs . There is no orderly change of govern­
ment .  The government took different forms within these few·years. There 
is no unity among the people and leaders on the form of government . 
Third , the lack of well-organized party-backing effective mobili­
zation poses a problem of political development in Bangladesh . Bangladesh 
is characterized by many political parties. But no political party is 
effective enough to mobilize people under one national ideology. This 
lack of a well-organized party creates confusion among the people 
causing a threat to stability and orderly change. 
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Fourth, the proper balance of the bureaucracy is an important 
problem of political development in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is facing the 
dilemma with regard to the effective balance of the bureaucracy. On the 
one hand, if bureaucracy is given too much power, it hinders the growth 
of political institutions. On the other hand, if the bureaucracy is not 
given much power, their non-cooperation hinders administration and the 
effective execution of politics. 
Fifth, the most precarious problem which seriously hinders poli­
tical development in Bangladesh is the problem of economic development. 
Failure in the solution of economic problems of the people leads to 
frustration leading to instability and ineffectiveness of the government. 
CHAPTER I I  
THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION 
The central problem in the developing countries is to achieve 
integration. Integration is the first requisite of political development .  
Without polit ical integration the goal o f  political development cannot be 
achieved. 
Myron Weiner has given several meanings to integration. "It means 
national integration, i. e . ,  to bring together culturally and socially dis·-
crete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a 
nat ional identity. 111 
The term integration covers a vast range of human relationships 
and attitudes--the integration of diverse and discrete cultural loyalties 
and the development of a sense of nationality; the integration of political 
units into a common territorial framework with P government which can exer-
cise authority; the integrat ion o f  the cit izen into a common polit ical 
process; and finally, the integrat ion of individuals into organizations 
for purposive activities . As diverse as these definitions are they are 
united by a common thread . These are all attempts to define what it is 
which holds a society and a political system together. 
1Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development" 
in Welch (ed .)  Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political 
Change (London: Wadsworth Publishing Co. , 1971) , pp. 130- 1 3 1 .  
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Bangladesh came into existence as a result of the failure of 
national integration after its establishment . The political scientists 
believed that there would be no problem of integration in Bangladesh 
because it had homogeneous population, geographic unity, and a common 
language. These are very important elements to form a nation, but i f  
we take into account Myron Weiner ' s  definition of national integration, 
we find Bangladesh still has problems with integration. 
Bangladesh has a homogeneous people. "The Muslims constituted 
80. 4 percent of the population; the Hindus 18.4 percent . Almost 98 per­
cent of the people speak Bengali .112 The Hindus are the dominant minority. 
Because of a long history of Hindu-Mus lim animosity the Hindus are still 
looked upon with suspicion by the Muslims . 
The main threat to territorial and nat ional integration came from 
the other national minorities in Bangladesh. "Their total number reaches 
500,000. They are settled primarily in the outlying regions of ·the repub-
lie. In the southeast (the Chittagong Hill Tracts) live several small 
national groups of Assamese-Burmese descent; the Chak.mas (in the Karma-
f ully River valley and to the north of it); the Marmas, who are sometimes 
also called the Maghs (to the south of the Karmafully River) ; the Tip-
peras or Tipuras, the Morongs or Murungs ;  the Tanchaungs; Karri s ;  Ryangs; 
3 lushies or Mizos, etc . "  
2 
Nyrop, An Economic Geography of Bangladesh. 
3
Lori V. Giankovsky, "The Social Structure of Society in the 
People:s Republic of Bangladesh, "  Asian Survey, March 1974. 
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The largest of the Assamese-Burmese people of the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts are the Chakmas, who inhabit the Ramgamati District.  "They 
number, according to the estimate at the end of 197 1 , - about 250, 000 
people. They are Buddhist s .  The Chakmas rebelled many times against 
the authority of the English colonizers, and until 1947 perceived a con-
s�derable amount of autonomy under the domination of the hereditary Rajah 
(king) of the Roy dynasty. The leaders of the several Chakma clans came 
out in 1947 against including the Rangamati District as a part of Paki-
stan and were suppressed by the East Pakistan authorities, some o f  whom 
later emigrated to India . 114 The infiltrations into the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts by tradesmen and entrepreneur-outsiders caused the politically 
active leaders of the Chakmas to t ry to achieve administrative autonomy 
for the region which they inhabited. This movement received support 
attested to by the victory of its leaders who stood as independents at 
the general elections in December, 1970.  In the summer of 1972 the 
leaders of the Chakmas sent a memorandum to the Bangladesh government ,  
pointing out the need to concede administrative autonomy to the Chittagong 
' 
Hill Tract and to form a special legislative body there. 
Bangladesh was created out of the regional dispar ity prevailing 
between East and West Pakistan. As such it has to pay special attention 
to the regional distribution because regionalism which started in the 
·Pakistani period may distrub Bangladesh also. But as far as development 
is concerned, we can find some inter-regional differences within Bangla-
desh. Bangladesh is divided into four regions : north, south, center and 
4 Ibid . , p .  7 0 1 .  
east.  The popularly-held view in Bangladesh generally casts the north 
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and south as underdeveloped ;  and indeed certain disparities between the 
north and south and the center and east can be discerned. ''The center-
east has most of the big urban centers,  the capital Dacca, the major port 
town Chittagong, and the maj or industrial center Narayangong, all lie in 
this region . The center-east has more people in non-agricultural labor 
(center 1 8 . 1 %; east 1 3 . 8%, north 1 1 . 1 % ,  south 1 6 . 5%) and a higher l iter­
acy rate (center 1 6 . 3%, east 1 9 . 3%,  north 1 6 . 7%, south 1 7. 7%). 11
5 
The center-east is more modern ; it also comprises most of the 
crowded districts and contains nearly half the province's population . 
There is more migration out of this region to the less crowded north and 
south. This int ernal migrat ion creates some resentment of migrants in 
the north and south. 
The north and south have developed more slowly. There is resent-
ment in these areas against the c entral government.  These are the large 
j ut e-producing areas. They are demanding a greater share in the distribu-
tion of wealth and are citing the exampl e  of the then East Pakistan, which 
' 
was used to earn maximum of foreign exchange. Of course, the present 
government is trying to concentrate more in the north and south. The 
opening of TV stations in Natore ( in the north) and Khulna (south) was 
directed to this end . 
The creation of national ideology helps to solve the problem of 
national integration. It serves as a unifying force among the various 
segments of the population . Lack of an ideology to inspire the hetero-
5 Rounaq Johan , Pakistan : Failure in National Integration (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1 971 ) ,  p .  5 .  
geneous population to indulge in various activities detrimental to 
national integration. 
In order to unite the nations Bangladesh needed a national 
24 
ideology. The six-point program which united the people of Bangladesh 
lost its significance after the creation of Bangladesh. That is why 
Sheikh Muj ibar Rahman tried to unite the people of Bangladesh under the 
ideology of Mujibism, i. e. , nationalism, democracy, secularism and social-
ism. Mehden remarks that in order to be successful the ideology ought to 
be general enough in scope and wording so as to unite a large part of the 
population. "Doctrines that are too explicit may be difficult to win mass 
6 allegianc e . "  
A second element usually found in successful ideological programs 
i s  the combination of ideology with organization. An ideological cam­
paign may fail if it i s  not accompanied by some long-term benefits. The 
failure of many new independent countries to attain the goals expected of 
independence has been one of the factors responsible for the high rate of 
military coups in the developing world. 
If we try to analyze Muj ibism on the basis of criterias given by 
Mehden, Mujibism is too general ,  without any substantive basis. Though it 
tried to embrace different ideologies such as democracy, socialism, secular­
ism and nationalism, it could not specifically mention the characteristics 
of the four principles of Muj ibism. It could not satisfy any group . None 
of the principles were satisfied fully. 
The supporters of democracy criticized Mujib ism because it gave 
excessive power to the Prime Minister giving him a chance of turning into 
6 von der Mehden, · Politics in the Developing Nations. 
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a dictator. They also criticized the emergency provisions of the con-
stitution which incorporated Mujibism. The emergency provisions will 
lead to a "perpetual emergency . 117 
The socialistic provision failed to satisfy the socialists who 
thought that making socialism a part of the directive principles of st�te 
without making that principle enforceable in a court of law, would not 
lead to the establishment of socialism in Bangladesh. One Bengali intel-
lectual referred to the constitution 11as a fundamental measure against 
socialism, democracy , nationalism and secularism. 118 
The concept of secularism created much frustration among the people, 
80. 9  percent of whom are Muslims. The Muslims thought of secularism as no 
religion and more satisfying to the Hindus . They also thought secularism 
was an Indian ploy to have more dominance in Bangladesh. 
As far as the second condition was concerned , though the Awami 
League had a well-organized base in the local levels , it could not combine 
the organization with ideology. Opposition was created within the organi-
zation . The main force of the Awami League , the Student League , was 
, 
divided on the issue of Mujibism. The Rab-Siraj faction of the Student 
League severely criticized Mujibism and insisted on scientific socialism. 
Moreover, this kind of ideology could not give any long range bene-
fits to the people. The main reason which influenced the Bangladeshi peo-
ple to get separation is that they were expecting a better life without 
7Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and 
Political Polarization,11 Asian Survey, Feb. 1975. 
8rbid. 
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Pakistan because in Pakistani period East Pakistan presently Bangladesh 
used to earn the maximum o f  foreign exchange. When Bangladesh became 
independent,  the people were �xpecting a happy and contented life. But 
on the contrary, they found the non-availability of essential goods, the 
ever-rising price index, the unequal sharing of austerity, the corruption 
and nepotism of the Awami League l eaders, and Indian influences in Bangla-
desh. Muj ibism, as an ideology , failed to satisfy the long-felt needs of 
the people. As such, it could not hold the population together . 
Some observers in Bangladesh took it for granted that the country 
would not have any difficulty in the task of identity building , but sub-
sequent events proved otherwise. The separation from Pakistan did not 
make it eas ier for the Bangladeshis to det ermine their identity and the 
search for identity in Bangladesh began soon after its separat ion from 
Pakistan. The Indian army, to whom the Pakistani soldiers surrendered , 
did not endear itself for long. Within a few weeks of the fall of Dacca, 
there were sporadic reports of clashes between Bengali soldiers of the 
Mukti Bahini and the Indian army . When Muj ib assumed office, after being 
• 
released from a Pakistani jail,  he recognized the growing sentiment against 
Indian soldiers in Bangladesh and persuaded Prime Minister Indira Ghandi 
to withdraw them. 
Even after the withdrawal of Indian troops, the strong influence of 
the Indian government persisted in Bangladesh. The numerous government 
officials, teachers , students,  politicians and prominent individuals who 
had spent months in India during the 1 97 1  liberation struggle were inclined 
to accept Indian influence in Bangladesh. They did not hesitate to raise 
the bogey of Pakistani collaboration against those who did not agree with 
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them. For a while, "patriotism seemed to be linked with pilgrimage to 
India. 11
9 
The public reaction was very quick. One Dacca newspaper wrote 
in disgust that Bangladesh was a nation of 65 million - collaborators . The 
10 
returnees from India were sarcast ically called 11Haj is11 by the critics 
of the Awami League governmen t .  
As events developed, Bangladesh sought its identity through an 
opposition to Indian influence and predominance. Following the Indian 
model, Bangladesh became a secular state and all political parties with 
Islamic leanings were banned from the day the Awami League l eaders assumed 
office in Dacca. To the critics, this ban was an Indian ploy to retain its 
influence in Bangladesh. But while officially Bangladesh r emained a secu-
lar state, the Islamic identity was continuously stressed to or by the 
public . Bengali Muslims had not been serious in stressing a Muslim ident-
ity in Pakistan politics, but they seemed more anxious to do so in secular 
Bangladesh. Islamic identity became the center of r esistance against Indian 
predominance in Bangladesh politics. In the summer of 1973, the so-called 
Muslim Bengali Movement was started by the right wing Islamic forces to 
' 
revive Muslim sentiment and to resist the secularism propounded by the 
ruling Awami League. 
The pro-Islamic forces began to rally around the octogefian leader , 
Maulana Bhasani, who professed socialism but believed in Islamic principles. 
He began advocating Islamic socialism. Within a few months of Bangladesh ' s  
independence, the Maulana began open and bitter criticism o f  Indian influ-
9Rashiduzzaman , "Changing Political Pat terns in Bangladesh: 
Internal Constraints and External Fears,"  Asian Survey, Sept . ,  1 97 7 .  
lOHaj is--pilgrims from Mecca. 
ence in Bangladesh. 11He also criticized the Awami League ' s  policy of 
secularism and gave tacit support to the "Muslim Bengali" movement by 
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saying that within six months time there would be a new flag in Bangla-
11 desh--a euphemistic reference to the flag of Muslim Bengal . "  However ,  
the movement largely dissipated when several of its prominant leaders were 
arrested for clandestine activities. Although the Maoists did not openly 
admit i t ,  there was a covert understanding between them and the right wing 
Islamists. There were numerous reports that the extreme left and moderate 
forces had struck an alliance on the basis of anti-Indian sentiment and 
opposition to the principle of Muj ibism, i . e . , nationalism, socialism, 
12  
secularism and democracy. 
Anti-Indian feelings and sympathy for Bangladesh ' s  identity as a 
Muslim nation became so strong that even Muj ib began to modify his policy. 
To the surprise of the Indian government and even his close political asso-
ciates, he accepted an invitation to attend the Islamic conference held in 
Pakistan in the spring of 1974. The Islamic Summit proved to be a net 
diplomatic gain for Muj ib because Pakistan used it to legitimize the deci-
sion to recognize Bangladesh. It also opened the door for Bangladesh to 
enter the United Nations and contact the Middle Eastern countries, which 
offered aid to new nations. Later in 1 9 7 4 ,  Muj ib visited Egyp t ,  Kuwait 
and other Muslim nations to promote understanding with those countrie s .  
The Awami League also granted clemency to the so-called Pakistani collabo-
rators and sought an understanding with the Islamic forces. By this time, 
l lRashiduzzaman, .£P.· cit.  
12 Bengali nationalism, popular idea of democracy, secularism based 
no discrimination against the Hindus or other minorities. Socialism, based 
on nationalization. All these ideas correspond to the ideas of Mrs. Indira 
Ghandi ,  the ex-Prime Minister of India. 
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there were numerous reports that the rightists were regrouping . At this 
stage, the Awami League government became concerned and arrested some 
old clemency. An official spokesman explained that some of these leaders 
were planning to set up a political party opposed to the principles of 
secularism. 
Although Sheikh Mujibar Rahman formally concentrated all power in 
his hands and made Bangladesh a one-party dictatorship early in 1 9 7 5 ,  his 
secret preparations reportedly started much earlier. The para-military 
forces called the Rakkhi Bahini were widely used to suppres.s dissent. Hard-
pressed by serious economic problems and challenges from the right as well 
as the left, the Awami League apparently sought a fresh identity for Bangla-
desh through the one-man dictatorship of a charismatic leader, Sheikh Muji-
bar Rahman. A brutal challenge to this endeavor came through the bloody 
coup of August 1 5 ,  1975. Innnediately after the coup, the young military 
rebels went on the radio and announced that Bangladesh was an Islamic state. 
The new president, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed, who took over from the leaders 
of the coup , later rescinded that announcement ,  evidently under Indian 
' 
government pressure. But the question of Islamic identity remained alive 
and in April 1 9 7 7 ,  when General Ziaur Rahman became president , the consti-
tution was amended to drop secularism and incorporate some Islamic prin-
ciples. 
The martial law administration had earlier made several gestures 
to the growing Muslim sentiment in Bangladesh. Soon after the August coup, 
ambassadors between Pakistan and Bangladesh were exchanged and communica-
tions re-established.  The Collaborators Act, 1972,  was repealed, which 
gave some legitimacy to those Muslim leaders who were alleged to have been 
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supportive of Pakistan in 19 71 . Several senior civil servants who were 
known to be sympathetic to Islamic views , were reinstated in important 
positions. After being outlawed for about four years_, the religious 
parties were allowed a formal existence in 1976. Official delegations 
were exchanged with Muslim countries. High officials began to partici­
pate and encourage Muslim religious festivals. Air Vice Marshall Tawab , .  
one of the military strong men, openly encouraged right wing forces and 
supported an Islamic ideology for Bangladesh. Ziaur Rahman visited Saudi 
Arabia and attended the Islamic Conference in Istanbul in 1976 . Intern­
ally, all these moves were also intended to mobilize the support of the 
Muslim forces who had opposed Muj ib and his secularist policy. 
There are several other questions relevant to the identity of 
Bangladesh. After Sheikh Mujibar Rahman who will be the f.ather of the 
nation? Will the present national anthem be retained? Is Rabindra 
Nath Tagore of Nazral Islam the national poet of Bangladesh? Since the 
assassination of Muj ib, his name has not been officially mentioned as 
the father of the nation except for the brief interval o f  Khalid Mushar­
raf ' s counter coup in November 1975 when : Muj ib was reinstated as the 
father of the nation. There were suggestions to acknowledge Maulana 
Bhasani, who received a state funeral when he died after a prolonged 
illness in 1976,  as the father of Bangladesh. But according to informed 
sources the military government does not intend to have any officially 
recognized father. There is also a question about the national anthem in 
Bangladesh. The conservative Muslims never accepted Tagore ' s  song as the 
national anthem while the pro-Peking radicals thought of it as a subtle 
means of expanding Indian influence in Bangladesh. It will be no sur-
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prise if the national anthem for Bangladesh is changed under assertive 
pressure from the right as well as the left. There is an inspiring cam-
paign in Dacca to develop Nazral Islam as the nat ional poet and adopt 
one o f  his songs as the nat ional anthem. All these problems clearly show 
the problem of identity. The present government is emphasiz ing Islamic 
principles, nationalism and sovereignty which are not clearly in agree-
ment on fundamentals. 
The integration of values, as Welch remarks, it encompasses at a 
minimum means that. there are acceptable procedures for the resolution of 
conflic t .  All societ ies have conflicts and all societ ies have procedures 
for the settlement of conflict are not always satisfactory . There are 
soc ieties where the r ight of tradit ional authority to resolve conflict 
remained intact during the early phases of modernization. 
There is the need for the integration of values because the scale 
and volume of conflict increases in societies experiencing modernization. 
The status of social groups is frequently changed , even reversed, as edu-
cation opens new occupat ional opportunities as the suffrage increases 
' 
the potential importance of numbers and as industrial expansion provides 
new opportunities for employment and wealth. A caste or tribe once low in 
status and wealth may now rise or at least see the opportunity f ormobility 
and social groups once high in status, power and wealth may feel threatened . 
Traditional rivalries are aggravated and new conflicts are created as social 
relationships change. 
The modernization process also creates new occupat ional roles and 
these new roles often conflict with the old . The new local government 
officer may be opposed by the tribal and caste leaders. 
Welch suggests "there are two model strategies for integrating 
values in the developing society. One stresses the importance of con-
sensus and is concerned with maximizing uniformity. The second method 
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is the way integrative values may be maximized emphasizes the interplay 
1 3  
of individual and group interests . "  
A modern political system has no single mechanism, no single pro-
cedure, no single institution for the resolution of conflict; indeed , it 
is precisely the multiplicity of individuals,  institutions and procedures 
for dispute settlement that characterizes the modern political system, 
both democratic and totalitarian. In contrast,  developing societies , . with 
an increasing range of internal conflic t ,  typically lacks such individuals,  
institutions and procedures. It is as if mankind ' s  capacity to generate 
conflict is greater than his capacity to find methods for resolving con-
flict; the lag is clearly greatest in societies in which fundamental eco-
nomic and social relationships are rapidly changing. 
Integration of values has become a predominant problem in Bangla-
desh because it is  endowed with so many ideologies and so many values . 
There is not yet any consensus on the question of the fundamentals of the 
state. 
The constitution was passed on November 4, 1972,  but it was severely 
criticized by the opposition parties, especially from pro-Peking leftist 
groups such as the National Awami Party-Bhasani ,  the communist party of 
Bangladesh, the Revolutionary Students Union and the Bangla-Students Union. 
They severely attacked the draft constitution and even challenged the right 
13welch, .££.· cit. 
of the Constituent Assembly to frame the constitution. According to 
Maulana Bhasani "the Constituent Assembly was elected under the 1970 
Legal Framework Order (LFO) of. General Yahya Khan to frame the consti-
tution of Pakistan . I t  got i�s mandate in the 6-point program �f- the 
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Awami League. But it got no legal claim to frame the constitution of a 
14 sovereign Bangladesh. They demanded that the constitution be framed 
by a national convention comprised of the representatives of all the 
political parties and mass-organizations which had participated in the 
liberation struggle and should be adopted by a referendum. 
According to this group the draft constitution was neither social-
ist nor even democratic. Though some good words about socialism had been 
incorporated in the fundamental principles of state policy there was no 
guarantee o f  food, clothing, shelter, education, medical care and employ-
ment for the citizens. There was no provision for confiscation of foreign 
capital and abolition of feudalism. Usual democratic human rights were 
denied by providing for so many restrictions to be imposed by law in the 
name of security, public order, morality and so on. 
"The National Social Party, led by A. S .  M. Abdur Rab and Maj or 
M. A.  Ja1il, remarked that the constitution was worthless .  I t  did not 
reflect the hopes and aspirations o f  the people. It did not recognize 
the class conflict nor was there any provision for removing economic 
inequality and exploitation, Accordingly, the realization of socialism 
was not possible through this constitution . 11 1 5  
14Abul Fazal Hoq , "Constitution Making in Bangladesh , "  Pacific 
Affairs, Spring 1973. 
15Talukdar Maniruzzaman, ..2..P_· cit . 
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The National Awami Party and the Communist Party of Bangladesh 
hailed the draft constitution for its provision for parliamentary govern-
ment and secularism and inclusion of fundamental right·s but contended that 
fundamental rights had been infringed by imposing certain restrictions on 
them. According to the party, adequate provisions had not been made for 
the establishment of socialism which was one of the accepted fundamental 
principles of state policy. There was no constitutional guarantee of 
basic necessities of life. The Prime Minister had been given too much 
power and , as a result, the smooth progress of parliamentary democracy 
might be handicapped. 
The existing government liaB. been transferred to . ..the: �·presi'd1!n.tia:l form 
of government. Accordingly, the election held gave a landslide victory 
to Ziaur Rahman. He announced for sovereign parliamentary election. 
Still, a majority of the people are unconcerned. The radical parties 
did not participate in the election. 
Bangladesh faces the problem of elite-mass integration. As Welch 
remarks, since fundamental cultural and attitudinal gaps exist between the 
. 
elite and the mass--the forme·r being secular minded,  English and Western 
educated while the latter remain oriented toward traditional values and are 
fundamentally religious, and vernacular speaking. The elite mass gap also 
implies that communication is inadequate ,  that is,  the elite are oriented 
toward persuading the mass to change their orientation but the feedback 
of political demands is not heard or not responded to.  
In all political systems, those of developing as well as developed 
societies, there are differences in outlook between those who govern and 
those who are governed. In a developed system, those who govern are 
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accessible to influence by those who are governed--even in a totalitar­
ian system and those who are governed are readily available for mobili­
zation by the government. In modern societies governments are so engaged 
in effecting the economy, social welfare and defense that there must be 
a closer interaction between government and the governed . Government must 
mobilize individuals to save, invest ,  pay taxes, serve in the army, and 
obey laws. Modern government must also know what the public will toler­
ate and must be able to anticipate ,  before the policies are pursued , what 
the public reaction to a given policy might be. Moreover, the modern 
government is increasingly armed with sophisticated tools of economic 
analysis and public opinion surveys to increase its capacity to predict 
both the economic and political consequences o f  its actions. 
But in the new nations there is no such developed mechanism for 
surveying public opinion. Moreover, what they often hear is always inapro­
priate. 
If we analyze the elite structure of Bangladesh, we will see many 
differences exist between the leaders and the masses . Before 197 1 ,  when 
East Bengali was part o f  Pakistan absolute state authority was concentrated 
in the hands of a narrow upper stratum of well-to-do classes. This stratem 
consisted of the numerically insignificant monopolistic upper crust of the 
industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, the upper layers of the landowners 
and the civil and military bureaucracy. In the ethnic respect the elite 
strata which ruled Pakistan was non-homogeneous and was dominated by those 
of Western and Norhtern Indian extraction or representatives of West Paki­
stan. The formation of the People ' s  Republic of Bangladesh deprived this 
elite layer of the ruling position which they had occupied in the former 
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Eastern Province of Pakistan. The leaders of the East Bengali National 
Movement and the social forces which they represented came into power in 
the young independent state. 
A process of cosolidating the new elite is taking place in Bangla­
desh. Joining its ranks are especially the representatives of the East 
Bengali nationalist bourgeoisie, the landowners, intelligentsia leaders 
and Bengalis, who up until 1971 had occupied posts in the prominent civil, 
j udicial and police services in East Pakistan, i . e . ,  actually those who 
were by birth from these social strata of society. 
But the elites have hardly any touch with the general public who 
live in the rural areas. The elites have little contact except on occa­
sions generally before the elections. There are no organized groups for 
the peasants to mobilize the people so that their interests are not aggre­
gated by the political system. 
These problems of integration need to be solved . But a long pro­
cess is needed for solving these problems. People should be integrated 
to national ideology and national goals which are basic requirements for 
development . 
CHAPTER III 
PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND ffi�ITY 
Like many underdeveloped countries the most precarious problems 
which Bangladesh is facing is the lack of unity and stability. This is 
one of the fundamental problems of political development. Peter H .  Merkyl 
in his book, Political Continuity and Social Change, has identified the 
problem of unity and stability as one o f  the problems of political develop-
1 ment. 
These problems o f  stability and unity are present in many develop-
ing countries. For example ,  in Indonesia, Javanese imperialism has led to 
four major insurrections in the Molucussor and Ambiona on two occasions in 
1950-51 and 1954-55, in Sumatra in 1 956-57 and a complex series o f  revolts 
2 
in Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes in 1958-66. 
Before analyzing instability in Bangladesh, we must be clear on the 
• 
definition of instability. Claude Ake in his article, "Modernization and 
Political Instability--A Theoretical Exploration," conceptualizes political 
instability implicitly or explicitly as violence ,  conflict, civi� disobedi-
1 Peter H .  Merky l ,  Political Continuity and Social Change (New York: 
, John Wiley Bros . ,  1967) . 
2Michael Breeher, "Political Instability in the New 
in Eckstein and Apter (eds . )  Corporate Politics (New York: 
1963) ' p. 18.  
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States of Asia , 11 
The Free Press , 
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ence, disorder, short duration of government , lack of institutionaliza-
tion and so forth. 3 
Feieband used aggressi,on of groups within the· political system 
as an indicator of political instability. 4 Jean Bhandel
 defines political 
instability as lack of longevity of government. For Hartin Needler, "a 
country is stable if  the government is chosen by free elections and if  
the government acts constitutionally . 115 
We shall analyze instability in Bangladesh in the sense of poli-
tical disorder, armed revolts, and short duration of the government. 
Soon after the creation of Bangladesh, infighting threatened the 
stability of the country. There was infighting between the various sec-
tors of the Mukti-Bahini (the liberation forces) . 
Though the constitution was drafted within six months and became 
effective on December 1 6 ,  1 9 7 2 ,  it faced bitter opposition from the oppo-
sition party though not in the Assembly which was dominated by the Awami 
League. "The constitution was criticized as creating a type of dictator-
ship by the Prime Minister and the emergency provision as perpetual emer-
gency. The constitution failed to inspire the vast majority of the youth 
6 
who liked to see more radical provisions included . "  
There were armed attacks on local law and order enforcing agencies. 
"Between June and November there were armed attacks on 52 thanas (admini-
3claude Ake, "Modernization and Political Instability , "  World Poli­
tic s ,  July 1974,  p. 802. 
4 Ibid . , p .  807. 
5Ibid. 
6Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1 9 7 3 :  Nation Building in a New State , "  
Asian Survey, Feb . ,  1977�  p .  199.  
strative unit composed of some villages) and police stations . 1 17 There 
were secret killings and kidnapping s .  There was growing antagonism 
within the Awami League. I t s  �ront organization, the - Student League, 
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was divided on the question of introduction of the scientific socialism 
and mixed economy. One faction, led by A .  S .  M .  Abdur Rab, demanded 
scientific socialism and the other faction advocated Muj ibism, i . e . , 
socialism, democracy, secularism and nationalism. Factionalism also 
started in the top Awami Leaguers . On January 2 5 ,  1975,  at the initia-
tive o� Sheikh Muj ib and against the private sentiments of the majority 
of the members of Parliament , the constitution was amended to provide for 
a presidential form o f  government .  The president was authorized t o  form 
one national party and to suspend the activities of all political groups 
that refused to join the new political party. The amendment further pro-
vided that Sheikh Mujib would be the president of the country for five 
years from the date o f  the constitutional amendment. Mujib announced on 
June 6. The constitution of the National Party called the Bangladesh 
Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL) . It was comprised mainly of the mem-
' 
bers of the Awami League. From the opposition, the National Awami Party 
(NAP) . the Moscow faction and the pro-Moscow Communist Party welcomed it . 
It was followed by other authoritarian measures. All newspapers were 
brought under government management .  Through a presidential ordinance on 
June 21, 61 districts were created by breaking up the existing 19 distric t s .  
O n  July 16, MuJib announced the names o f  61 governors who were t o  take dis-
trict administration on September 1 ,  1 9 7 5 .  The governors designated were 
7rbid . ,  p .  200. 
given special training starting July 2 1 ,  which was to continue until 
August 16,  1975.  There was also the plan to place ha�f a battalion o f  
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the Jatiyo Rakki Bahini (the N?tional Defense Force) under each governor . 
The governor would be under direct control of Sheikh Mujib. The Jatiyo 
Rakki Bahini units would be increased annually so that by the end of 1980 
the total strength would be 130, 000, one regiment under each governo r .  
"The new system of copying the Soviet method but rejecting the ideology 
was designed to suppress every vestige of opposition and perpetuate the 
corrupt rule of the Sheikh Mujib tribe in the softest state in the world. 118 
Due to this change o f  government and growing frustrations among 
the public for the constant failure of Mujib to solve problems triggered 
the army coup of August 1 6 ,  1975,  which killed Sheikh Mu jib and his family. 
The army brought Khondokar Mushtaque Ahmed , ex-Foreign Trade Minister , as 
the president of Bangladesh. He replaced General Ziaur Rahman as the Chief 
of Staff of the Army . On November 3,  several senior officers led by Briga-
<lier Khaled Musharraf staged a second coup. The leaders of the November 3 
coup negotiated with President Mushtaque and allowed a safe passage to 
' 
Bangladesh for the 1 5  military officers who were widely known to be con-
nected with the August 1 5  coup. The leaders of the November 3 coup lost 
heart when the news spread in the evening o f  November 4 that four leaders 
of the BKSAL, Tajuddin Ahmed, ex-Finance Minister; Syed Nazral Islam, ex-
Industries Minister; Monsoor Ali, ex-Prime Minister; and Qamruzzaman, ex-
Commerce Minister, were found dead in the Dacca central jail. On November 
5,  Khaled Musharraf and his associates forced Mushtaque to hand over the 
presidency to the Chief Justice o f  the Supreme Cour t ,  A .  S .  M. Sayem. 
8talukdar Maniruzzaman, " Bangladesh in 1974:  Economic Crisis and 
Political Polarization, " Asian Survey, Feb. 1975 . 
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On November 6 ,  the Jawan� (soldiers) and the Sepoys (non­
commissioned soldiers) staged another revolution which killed Khaled 
Musharraf. Zia was able to re�tore discipline within ·the army, but he 
faced opposition from the disgruntled Awami Leaguers, many of whom left 
India ' s Jatiyo Samaj tantrik: Dal (the National Socialist Party) which 
believed in the establishment of scientific socialism. In February 1976,  
some sepoys in Chittigong rebelled , but it was suppressed . 
General Zia became pnesi'dent when Justice Sayem resigned in early 
1977 . On May 30, 1977 there was a nation-wide referendum on confidence 
in Ziaur Rahman. He received 99 percent pf yes votes. After the refer­
endum two months followed without any kind of violence . On August 1 5 ,  
1 9 7 7 ,  there were reports of clashes betwe�n the Awami League workers and 
the army when the Awami League tried to mourn the day for Sheikh Muzib . 
There were also reports of sporadic violence in the countryside. 
Zia once again faced threats to his position and stability of the 
economy when an abortive coup on September 30 and October 2 killed 1 1  Air 
Force officers and 10 soldiers. The coup start�d in Bogr:a on September 30 
and the rebels then struck Dacca on October 2 when Japanese terrorists 
hijacked a JAL plane to Dacca airport from where they bargained for the 
release of their jailed compatriots in Japan and a six million dollar 
ransom. 
Almost the entire Bangladesh administration , including top Air 
Force officials, were negotiating with the terrorists at Dacca airport. 
It provided an ideal opportunity for the disgruntled elements within the 
armed forces to stage a revolution which was quickly suppressed. "Total 
casualties on both sides exceeded 230. About 500 people were tried for 
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alleged complicity and 92 persons received the death sentence for incit-
9 
ing rebellion. " 
Although the abortive �oup was quickly suppressed , it has shaken 
the morale of the military administration . Zia is under pressure from 
his colleagues who fear that such coup attempts might become a periodic 
feature in Bangladesh threatening the stability of the country unless 
drastic steps are taken to depolit��ize the soldiers. This explains why 
the military tribunals went into action immediately after the coup. 
"The influx of Muslims, numbering about 140 , 000 from the Arakan 
area of Burma, created further problems of stability in Bangladesh. They 
have been evicted by the Burmese government and they have rushed into the 
. 10 neighboring Muslim country of Bangladesh. " However ,  the problem has 
been settled by the bilateral initiatives of Bangladesh and Burmese govern-
ments. 
All these show the prevailing instability in Bangladesh. We shall 
try to find out the causes of instability. First , the problem o f  legiti-
macy: the government body needs legitimacy. I t  is the main reason for 
the short duration of government in the underdeveloped countries. 
According to Lucian Pye, "A legitimacy crisis is a breakdown in 
the constitutional structure and performance of government that arises out 
of differences over the proper nature of authority for the system. A legiti-
macy crisis can thus take the form o f  a change in the fundamental structure 
or character of a government , a change in the source from which it claims 
91bid . '  p .  2 1 5 .  
lOThe Bangladesh Observer, May 1 1 ,  1978 . 
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t o  derive i t s  ultimate authority o r  a change i n  the ideals i t  professes 
to represent. Basic to a legitimacy crisis is a change in the way in 
which governmental authority i� conceived or itself act s . 11 1 1  
Lucian Pye has identified four principle causes o r  sources of 
1 . . . . h d 1 t 12 egitimacy crises in t e eve opmen process .  First , there i s  the 
breakdown of governmental institutions that occurs because of conflicting 
or inadequate bases for claiming authority in the society. Second , govern-
ment structures may disintegrate because there i s  excessive and uninstitu-
tionalized competition for power. Third, national leaders and the govern-
mental divisions of authority may collapse because the justifications for 
the ideological or pragmatic claims to authority have been based on unaccept-
able readings of history or faulty predictions of future developments .  
Finally, and probably most basically, a legitimacy crisis may arise because 
people have been inappropriately socialized; their feelings about authority 
are not functional for the efforts of the current leaders . 
I f  we analyze the situation in Bangladesh, almost all the causes 
mentioned by Lucian Pye prevail.  There was a complete breakdown of the 
governmental machinery when the August coup took place in 1 9 7 5 .  Since 
then there have been many uninstitutionalized groups which have tried to 
capture power by force. Many abortive coups took place within a short 
span of time . From August, many group s ,  especially the radical group, 
tried to capture power unconstitutionally. A vacuum has been created in 
leadership. The orderly means of transfer of power has been blocked. 
l l1ucian W. Pye, "Legitimacy Crisis in the Developing Society, " in 
Firkle and Gable (eds . ) ,  E£· c i t .  
12Ibid . ,  p .  542 . 
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because no group has the legitimacy to assume power .  The assumption of 
power by Mushtaque on August 1 5 ,  President Sayem on November 3, and 
President Zia on January 1 ,  1 9 7 7  does not have a great deal of legitimacy . 
There is no unity among the elites for the stable constitutional means of 
transfer of power. The leadership is divided and busy in gaining power 
by any means . 
Legitimacy crisis arose because of the failure of leadership to 
fulfill people ' s  expectations. The people of Bangladesh expected a better 
life after being separated from Pakistan . But Sheihk Muj;ib failed to 
satisfy the expectation of the people. Moreover, he disregarded the very 
inherent value of the people, for example, the most respected Islami·c · · 
religion of the majority of the population of Bangladesh. Sheikh Muj:ib 
promised a better way of living within three years time, but three years 
passed without any improvement for the people. This greatly undermined 
the claims of authority of the leadership . 
The ex1st.ing ' mifitai;y regime faced the problem: of legitimacy because 
there was no popular sanction behind their ass�mption of power. That is 
why after assuming power, General Zia called a nation-wide referendum which 
gave him 99 percent of yes votes. Still, they could not fully establish 
his legitimate authority because there is distrust among the people on the 
turnout rate. 
All these feelings convinced Zia to base his authority by popular 
support . He allowed political activities from April 1 9 7 8 .  The election 
on June 3 ,  1978 gave Zia the legitimacy which he wanted very much. "Zia 
secured 76 . 72 percent while General (Rtd . )  Osmani secured 2 1 . 65 percent 
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of the total votes cast. " 1
3  Still , there are several allegations about 
the election. In an interview with the newsmen after the election, Gen-
eral Osmani remarked that "the election was not free and fair . "  He put 
forward several demands such as restoration of human and fundamental 
rights, release of all political prisoners ,  and withdrawal of martial 
14 
law. " 
Secondly, the loss of charisma� The rise of charismatic leaders 
is one of the fundamental characteristics of the developing countries . 
Instability is created when charisma loses its image. The charisma of 
Mujib united all the people of Bangladesh under his command . The causes 
of instability and disunity can be related to the loss of charisma ip 
national leadership . 
The term "charisma" will be applied to a certain quality of an 
individual ' s  personality by virtue of which lre is set apart from ordinary 
men and treated as - if endowed with the supernatural, superhuman or at 
1 . f .  11 . 1 li . 15 east speci 1ca y except1ona powers or qua ties. These are not access-
ible to ordinary persons but are regarded as of divine origin or as exem-
plary and on the basis of them; the individual concerned is treated as a 
leader. It is very often thought of as resting on magical powers. 
I f  a leader is to serve as a charismatic leader, he 
must be perceived as goal-fulfilling by the masses 
i . e. , he must be perceived as offering a relevant 
solution to the problems of the identifying indi­
viduals. At least three' factors are involved: 
image formation, image communication and image 
reinforcemen t . 111 6  
i 3The Bangladesh Observer , June 6 ,  1978.  
14Ibid. 
1 5Monte Palmer, The Dilemmas of Political Development (Ill . : F .  E . 
Peacock Publishers, Inc . , 1973) , p .  102 . 
16Ibid . ;  p. 7 9 .  
First, the aspirant to charisma, he states, must be able to 
create an image of strength and generally epitomize whatever other 
virtues are perceived as relev.ant amo�
.
� the target audience. Without 
the image o f  strength, real or imagined , the leader is in a poor posi­
tion to serve as a beacon of reference and security for those plagued 
by the confusion of social or psychic organization. 
An image of strength is made up of many things, both real and 
imagined. Most of the well-known charismats have slain real dragon s .  
Nasser evicted the British from the Egyptian base, nationalized the 
Suez Canal and emergea victorious from the 1956 tripartite invasion of 
Egypt by England, France and Israel. Sheikh Muj ib was successful in 
creating the image because he was . the leader to demand liberation from 
Pakistani rule. 
If a charismatic leader is to attract a national following he 
must connnunicate the image he has created and the program he has pro­
posed to individuals with differing problems, aspiration s ,  and backgrounds . 
Attempts to appeal to diverse audiences entail the danger of making con­
tradictory statements. This problem, however, has seldom come to the 
force. Assuming a strong need to identify with a leader, target indivi­
duals appear more than willing to rationalize the conflicting aspects of 
the leader ' s image. They maintain that he really conforms to their inter­
pretation of his image but he must say nice things to other groups as a 
matter of expediency . Charismats , in turn, have sought to mitigate such 
conflict by operating at a vague and abstract level. In this respect, 
Sheikh Mujib faced a problem because he had to satisfy d i f ferent rival 
factions which competed with each other for power . 
A third condition emphasized by Max Weber for a charismatic 
leader is that he must reinforce the image or continue to provide a 
meaningful crutch for the faithful. If his power wanes, if competi-
tive purveyers of charisma appear more relevant , or if concrete pro-
grams fall in direct conflict with ther mass values, then the basis 
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for the charisma i s  undermined and the quality and intensity o f  identi-
fication patterns decreases or becomes totally extinguished. A char-
ismatic leader who fails to reinforce his image continually will more 
than likely cease to be goal-fulfilling for those who identify with him . 
To the extent that this occurs, he ceases to be a charismatic leade r .  
He may remain i n  power b y  virtue o f  coercive o r  economic assets but no 
longer enjoys the ability to mobilize the masses by means of identitive 
assets based on their identification with him. In this respect ,  Sheikh 
Mujib was a complete failure. He failed to reinforce his image as a 
charismatic leader by gratifying the public demands. He could not keep 
his promises as expected by the people. 
"In order to reinforce the image the charismatic leader must 
undertake different strategies11 1 7  such as first, the strategy of permanent 
crisis. Sheikh Mujib tried to relate everything to Pakistani colonial rule. 
But it did not satisfy the people because the question of the Pakistan 
domination does not arise at all after 1 97 1 .  
Second, VIP strategy, i . e . ,  the role as an international leade r .  
For example, SukarDP.:> opened u p  the Bandung Conference i n  1 9 5 5 .  Sheikh 
Mujib attended the Islamic Conference in Lahore in 1979 and the Common-
1 7  Ibid. , p .  83.  
wealth Conference in 1972,  but he could not create any image as an 
international leader because he lacked the potential to create Bandung 
or Non-alignment like Nehru o� Sukarno . 
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Third, the development plan as polit ical strategy . In this 
respect, Sheikh Mujib was a complete failure because he could not under­
take any development strategy. Moreover, he failed with the problems of 
inflation and food shortages which crippled his image. 
Fourth, the elimination of competing prophets strategy , i . e . , to 
eliminate the opposition. Sheikh Mujib banned all political activities 
and created one party rule by establishing the BKSAL , but this was criti­
cized by the people. 
Fifth, " • • •  the strategy of ideology building--Nasser, Nkrumah 
Sukarno, Castro, all .charismatic leaders ,  attempted to reinforce their 
images and to overcome some of the heterogeneity of their countries by 
providing a new ideology capable of integrating all the values . 11 18 In 
a similar way, Sheikh MuJib created Mu3 ibism, which found bitter opposi­
tion even from his own party. 
The nature of the charismatic relationships and the purpose of the 
charismatic strategies is to focus power in the hands of a single indivi­
dual . As long as the leader ' s perceptions are in tune with reality and he 
uses his position to pursue policies based upon sound advice, his power 
might well result in the benefits of charisma. This, however, is not 
always the case. 
As structural rigidities block outlets for change and mobility 
within the system, the only alternatives for change become those of vio-
18rbid . ,  p .  86 . 
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lence. When violence succeeds, the recriminations that follow are 
generally as violent as to fear as under the solidarity-building work 
of the deposed charismat , a pr�cess that must begin anew. The char­
ismats were reluctant to give political institutions sufficient power 
to challenge their authority . They thereby crippled the ability of the 
major political institutions of their states to live in an independent 
existence .  They also discourage the rise o f  a second man . With the 
passing of a charismat , therefor� the potential for intensive and divi­
sive conflicts run high. The more intense such conflict becomes , the 
greater the prospect that parochial conflicts submerged by the presence 
of the leader will be rekindled as contestants seek support for their 
respective positions. 
The entire popularity of the Awami League was based on the per­
sonal appeal of Muj ib. There was no institutionalized structure. His 
inability to build new institutions, to replace the one destroyed during 
the liberation struggle such as a respected bureaucracy, the viability of 
the opposition party, an impartial j udiciary, a . free enterprise economy, 
an open education system, brought about a crisis of leadership. It gave 
rise to a situation in which public confusion has increased and the chances 
of social mobilization have decreased. 
The present government of Major General Ziaur Rahman, though a 
military leader, still bases his authority on charisma. He developed 
charisma during the liberation period when Sheikh Mu�.ibar Rahman was 
taken prisoner by the army on March 26,  1 9 7 7 .  Ziaur Rahman was the first 
man to declare independence of Bangladesh from the Chittagong radio station. 
He formed the resistance movement in Chittagong against the Pakistani Army . 
He is trying to base his autho�ity:· o� econq�i� 4�velopment _and. 
sovereignty of the country. He has undertaken massive programs of 
economic development .  Stil l ,  there are many problems confronting the 
existing regime. 
An analysis of the military regime shows that the armed forces 
so 
as a whole seldom rule. The military regime is a government in which 
particular military elite rule. These elites may or may not have the 
support of the rest of the armed forces. Gaining and maintaining that 
support i s ,  in fact, generally a continual concern to the ruling military 
elites. There are cleavages within the army . Moreover, the cleavages 
within the military are often exacerbated after it seizes power and 
becomes further divided between those officers who assume positions in 
the government and those who do not. Zia is facing the problem of bring­
ing unity among the army which is highly politicized. Moreover ,  there 
always arise conflicts between the officers and the Jawans which is highly 
destructive to army disc�pline. 
Generally, military regimes are anti-political. They distrust 
political activities and try to avoid any kind of popular participation. 
In this respect ,  Zia is more tactful . Though at first he banned all poli­
tical activities, he could feel that he could not continue his power in 
this way. That is why he announced the formation of a new party, Tpe_ Nation­
alist Democratic Party, and opened up political activities after Apri l ,  
1978. 
He also held a presidential election on the basis of universal 
adult sufferage on June 3 ,  1978 which gave him a landslide victory over 
his opponent .  Still, there i s  some question as to whether he i s  following 
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the footsteps of Ayub Khan. There is also doubt whether he will also 
suffer the same kind of fate as Ayub Kbah in 1969 . Ayub Khan came to 
power in the wake of the decla.ration of martial law ih 1958 . After 
assuming power he changed himself to civilian rule. As an army man he 
was very fearful of democracy . So,  he created a cloak of dictatorship 
in the name of "basic democracy . "  People gradually demanded democracy 
which was suppressed by Ayub . As a result of this , the people rose in 
rebellion which. ultimately forced Ayub Khan"t�,·l"e$Jgp in 1969 . 
Third,  the threat of India. Bangladesh, which was:.created ' in 1971 
through th.e direct intervention of India with the active support of Soviet 
Russi.a, : sooiufound itself in a position of a dependent state of India . 
First, the Indian army, before th.ey were withdrawn from Bangladesh, took 
to India the vast amo.unt of arms and ammunition left by the surrendering 
Pakistani army and kept the naseant Bangladesh army virtually disarmed. 
Second , the Indian government imposed a trade agreement on Bangladesh 
providing for free trade with.in ten miles of the border of each country . 
Through th.i.s border trade agreement (which was .terminated at the end of 
the first year of independence in th.e face of stiff public pr�test in 
Bangladesh) , India siphoned off from Bangladesh. a large part of foreign 
grants and huge quantities of jute, rice and other essential commodities . 
The Indian government also slackened the anti-smuggling operation along 
the Indian borders, as smuggling on the India-Bangladesh border went in 
favor of India. India always defaulted in the export to Bangladesh of 
items provided in the annual trade agreements, while Bangladesh exceeded 
targets in its exports to India . India t s  failure to export coal particu­
larly hi.t the Bangladesh economy . In spite of all the concessions made to 
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India , the government of Sheikh Muzib could not even get a fair deal in 
the Ganges water dispute except for a face-saving interim government . 
Naturally, the militai:y elite who took over i·n �angladesh in the 
August coup of 1975, especially those who came into power on November 7 ,  
1975 after the abortive Indian-backed putsch of Brigadier Khaled Musharraf, 
took every possible measure to get the country out of the position of 
dependence on India, reflecting the changed mood of the people of Bangla-
desh. Since then the Indian government applied pressure to make the new 
government subservient to Indian desires . First ,  the Indian government 
began to divert the Ganges water at Farakka without prior consultation 
with the Bangladesl. government, contrary to the April 1974 agreement . 
"The diversion of the Ganges water during the 
dry season (November 1975 to May 1976) adversely 
affected the irrigation system, navigation, indus­
try, power generation, intrusion of salinity, 
fisheries, forestry, livestock, drinking water 
and public health in 37 percent of the total 
area of Bangladesh with 33 percent of the popu­
lation . 19 
Second, the Indian government began to shelter the diehard Mui,i-
bites (followers of Sheikh Mu�.ib) led by Kader Siddiqui, a tough guerrilla 
leader of the 1971 liberation war who opened camps for training in guerrilla 
warfare and subversion. Since January 1976 these Bangladesh dissenters have 
launched raids on Bangladesh. border posts with the support of the Indian 
Border Security Force . In the latter part of the year some of. the dissente�s 
infiltrated into Bangladesh in order to carry on sabotage activities. 
19Rashiduzzaman , .££.· cit . ,  p .  2 1 6 .  
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However, the relationship with India under the Desai government 
is much better than the previous government. Still, there is constant 
fear of India among the people because India is a great neighbor encirc-
ling Bangladesh on three sides. 
Fourth, factionalism, the main cause of instability is widespread 
factionalism in every sector. In every group there are factions. There 
are divisions within the bureaucracy which are divided into collaborators, 
non-collaborators, and returnees from Pakistan. They are also aligned 
with the political leaders so when a change of government takes place, 
it leads to a change in the bureaucracy. 
Factionalism exists within the army too, i.e. , the freedom fighters, 
the returnees from Pakistan, and the national defense forces. The army is 
very much politicized. There are also differences between the soldiers and 
the officers. The radical parties created cells in the enlisted ranks who 
have revolted against the officers. It is very difficult to control such 
a politicized army. The army and the bureaucracy are very much aligned 
with the political leaders who use them for their necessity. 
There are strong decentralizing tendencies within the political 
centers of the underdeveloped states. 
"The stability of any central coalition rests upon 
the various elites perception that their participa­
tion in the coalition is yielding rewards ; on their 
ability to maintain control over their own individual 
followings; and whose elements of patrimonialism are 
present, on the ability of the patrimonial le�der to 
keep his personal retainers from entrenching them­
selves and establishing their own political fiefdoms. 
The obvious difficulties in meeting these conditions 
explain much of the factional conflict that of ten 
appears in underdeveloped states. "20 
20 ( Robert P. Clark, Jr., Development and Instability Tennessee: 
Dryden Press, 1 974), p. 101. 
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The natural pattern of decentralization is exacerbated in a 
variety of ways . First , the central leadership frequently attempts to 
gain control over both the center and the periphery by expanding the 
government ' s  scope through the organization of development agencies and 
the integration of voluntary association directly into the government. 
By offering the elites new sources of patrimony the new agencies increase 
both the complexity of the coalitions and the possibility of competition 
between elites . 
Decentralization has also been exacerbated by political leadership 
that has proven, more often than not, to be less than competent. Ideologi­
cal rigidity and limited understanding have caused many rulers of under­
.aeveloped states to fritter away their small initial political capital of 
legitimacy, disruptive capacity, inertia and coercion by investing it in 
non-essential undertakings . More than this , a patrimonial leader ' s  efforts 
to maintain his autonomy and authority seem, at times , self-defeating. The 
consequences of such incpmpetent :.leadership and rapid expansion of govern­
ment activity is usually an escalation in fac�ional conflict. Anxious to 
maintain their followings , but confronted with limited resources at the 
center , elites utilize a variety of different resources for their own 
personal. end s .  Reciprocity between elites breaks down and each seeks to 
mobilize resources on his own behalf rather than on behalf of a ruling 
coalition or patrimonial leader . Nation-building becomes faction-building. 
Because of its bigness ,  the Awami League has opened up different 
fron� .as':'for ·:exa.\Xlpl.e, the student league, the labor league, youth league 
and peasant league. This decentralization is helpful for gaining and 
�gathering more support , but it is difficult to maintain a hierarchical 
discipline within the fronts . Moreover, these fronts tried to estab-
lish an autonomous organization apart from the Awami League . For 
exampl e ,  the chairman of the youth leagu e ,  Sheikh Fazlul Hoq Moni , 
openly stated that he had no connection with the Awami League. Thus , 
we see factional conflict has been aggravated by decentralization of 
power . -
Factional conflicts are sometimes based on ideology. 
"The 1958 dispute between Milton Margai and 
Albert Margai in the ruling Sierra Leone 
People ' s Party which culminated in the 
latter ' s organizing an opposition party 
was based in large part on the desire o f  
Albert Margai and supporters t o  speed up 
social reform . 112 1  
55 
The influence of too many ideologies has led to the growing factionalism 
in Bangladesh. The factionalism in the Student League which led to the 
coming up of JSD was based in the ideology of introducing scientific 
socialism. The ideological contrasts will be discussed in detail in a 
later chapter. 
More generally, however ,  factional conflict seems to have its 
genesis in personal conflicts among the elites and in their efforts to 
consolidate their own personal support . Faction building focuses around 
the development o f  personal machines through which a particular leader can 
attract supporters . For the most part, such machines are depednent on the 
leader ' s continued access to patronage. Because they need such access 
factional leaders tend to stay within the government unless they enjoy 
enough traditional status or personal wealth to maintain a following or 
unless they perceive the possibility o f  oppositional elites actually cap-
21Ibid . ,  p .  106. 
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turing control of the government . In general , factional conflict remains 
within the confines of the regime with conflicting elites utilizing their 
control over ministries and p�rty organs fo provide spoils to their exist-
ing supporters and to attract new ones . Corruption, it should be noted, 
is an integral part of this process . Elites manipulate revenues to their 
own advantage and to the advantage of their supporters . 
There was widespread corruption in the government . Even Sheikh 
Mu�ib admitted himself that he·.:could not build up the country because of 
widespread corruption in every sector . 
The process of modernization is highly destabilizing to political 
institutions and to the broader social system of which they form a part . 
S .  N .  Eisenstadt,  for example, states that : 
"Disorganization and dislocation constitute a basic 
part of modernization and this process brings with 
it of necessity the growth of social problems , cleav­
ages and conflicts between various groups and movements 
of protest. The causal factors are the well-known com­
ponents of modernization: urbanization (which destroys 
rural family and clan ties) , industrialization {which 
has undermined traditional occupational security and 
work discipline mores) , political . centralization and 
democratization (which has dislo!fged traditional elites 
from their favored positions) , secularization (which 
has weakened the position of long-established values 
and standards of performance) , and social mobilization 
(which has heightened mass awareness of depriv�2ions 
and socio-cultural cleavages in the society) . "  
All these dislocations and disorganizations , according to Eisen� 
stadt, produce the continual growth of social problems which he defines 
as breakdowns or devLations of social behavior involving a considerable 
number of people which are of serious concern to many members of the 
society in which the aberrations occur. 
22Monte Palmer , ££.• cit . ,  p .  73.  
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Samuel Huntington, in his excellent extended essay on political 
decay, finds there to be a strong correlation between rapid political 
mobilization and political ins�ability. According to · Runtington , the 
one inescapable component of political modernization is the expansion 
of political participation, the rapid mobilization of ever-increasing 
numbers of individuals who beat at the doors of the slowly evolving 
political structure with incessant demands for change . The integral 
parts of social mobilization--heightened awareness of relative levels 
of poverty and unequal distribution of wealth, increased exposure to 
political activism and its practical results and an enhanced sense of 
the latent power which lies in the hands o f  the mob are supposed to pro-
duce the systematic disruption which accompanies the modernization process . 
Robert E .  Clark identifies different sources of instability: 23 
First, cognitive dissonance or stress engendered by an incongruence 
between image and expectation on the one hand , and perceptions of reality 
on the other. The lack of congruence between expectations and reality 
can be severely disruptive and can be illustrat.ed with examples drawn 
from states in the process of rapid disjunctive modernization. 
23 
"Indonesia has been wracked by mass kiL.ings which 
have had heavy overtones of the bloody confrontation 
of competing and antithetical value systems . The 
killings began after the failure of the attempted 
coup d '  etat launched by Indonesian Communist Party 
against the Indonesian army in September 1965. In 
retribution, and in light of Indoneisan leader 
Sukarno ' s  inability or unwillingness to punish the 
communists, the army initiated a series of raids 
against the communist party headquarters and strong­
holds . The result was the unleashing of intense 
Robert E .  Clark, .££.• cit . ,  p.  215.  
popular hatred of the communists by the more 
traditional mystical Hindus who vented their 
anger by killing an estimated 250,000 to 350,000 
communist leaders and militants as well' as many 
sympathizers . 112� 
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In the same way the causes of ins�ability in Bangladesh can be related 
to as the gap between expectations and reality. Sheik Mujib could not 
satisfy any of the demands of the people who expected so much from him. 
He dissatisfied the army by creating Bangladesh Rakkhi Bahini and giving 
more power to them; dissatisfied the bureaucracy by threatening them with 
the precaution of the loss of job anytime; dissatisfied the people with 
the rising cost of living; by not giving due respect to the majorities 
religion . All these are responsible for creating frustrations which led 
to instability. 
Second , deprivation : In this case, the actor perceives himself 
as being physically or affectively interfered with, severely restricted 
in activity, in stimuli or in social relations , or in extreme cases, actu-
ally deprived of the physical factors required for survival . The indivi-
dual senses that his environment has become threatening and that a critical 
region has been approached in which his well being and stability can no 
longer be taken for granted . This deprivation was very much predominant 
in Bangladesh. Moreover , they realized that their economic condition had 
deteriorated more compared :to the Pakietani period . 
Ted Gurr has examined in great detail the nexus between the psycho-
logical phenomena of frustration aggression and relative deprivation on the 
one hand , and the recourse to civil violence on the other. He argues that 
frustration-aggression causes tension in human beings and this mechanism 
24
Ibid . ,  p .  216.  
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is triggered by the presence of relative deprivat�on . Relative depriva­
tion, which Gurr defines as "the perceived d iscrepancy between value 
expectations and value capabil�ties, thus appears to ·be a principal 
factor in impelling men to such levels of instability that they are led 
to inflict damage on each other . 112 5  
Gurr has identified at least three broad patterns of relative 
deprivation; each involves a rapid widening of the gap between one ' s  
expectations and his capabilities . The first type of deprivation, which 
Gurr calls aspirational , comes about when value expectations are increas-
ing rapidly and value capabilities remain relatively stationary . In July 
1962 the civilian armed forces of Peru deposed the outgoing civilian govern­
ment of Manuel Prado in order to assure the subsequent election of Fernando 
Belaunde Terry who had barely missed securing a plural ity of the votes in 
the national presidential election in June . At that time the army held 
high aspirations for the Belaunde government .  In the first place, Bel aunde ' s  
brand o f  reform promised to bring the modernization o f' the country ' s  eco­
nomic and social system, which the army leaders believed would forestall 
the popular uprising which had been threatening Peru for decades . Further , 
Belaunde pledged to secure national control and ownership over the petro­
leum reserves of the country by nationalizing the holdings of the Inter­
national Petroleum Corporation . On both counts , while the army ' s  expecta­
tions soared , their nation ' s  capabilities remained stationary . By 1967 
the country ' s economic problems had worsened to such an extent that urban 
unrest ,  inflation and strikes alternated with alarms of guerrillas filter­
ing in from the rural areas . In the area of national control over natural 
2 5Ibid . , p .  2 1 7 . 
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resources , the Belaunde government proved as unable to deal with the 
situation . The armed forces leaders drew the obvious conclusion, that 
civilian politics , as usual , were failing to meet their high expectations 
which had prompted them to put Belaunde into power in the first place. 
On October 3 ,  1968 , the armed forces of Peru overthrew the Belaunde govern-
ment and moved to establish an army regime o f  long standing endowed jwith 
the necessary power and ideological conviction to deal decisively with 
Peru ' s aggravated economic and social problems . 
In the same way in Bangladesh, the Awami League government failed 
in every respec t .  Inflation rose and government nationalization o f  indus-
tries was an utter failure due to corruption and mismanagement. o f  the 
administrators of the nationalized industries . These factors led to the 
coming up of the military government like the developing countries of the 
world . 
Progressive deprivation , Gurr ' s second model , is seen to develop 
from the much more complex situation in which value expectations and value 
capabilities rise sharply together for a period, followed by a sharp drop 
in capability, thereby opening a widening gap between the two variables . 
"As Tanter and Midlarsky have indicated , Cuban/G�'P /Cap increased steadily 
every year from 1948 through. 1951 and then turned downward sharply from 
1951 through 1953 (the year of Castro ' s first assault on the Cuban govern-
ment in his attack on the Moncada barracks ) . Tanter and Midlarsky reason 
that this dramatic illustration o f  progressive deprivation in the economic 
sphere prepared Cuba for the onset of the guerrilla revolutionary war which 
followed soon after and made them more receptive to Castro ' s movement . 1126 
26 
· Ibid. , p .  2 1 8 .  
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The third form of relative deprivation, which Gurr has labeled 
decremental deprivation, involves the maintenance of stable value expect­
ations by a gro�p confronted �ith declining value capabilities . For 
example, the calls hy Tanzania ' s  President Julius Nyreree to recreate a 
kind of communal , rural socialism in his country have also failed to guar­
antee a full and equitable distribution of rapidly dwindling agricultural 
resources . Thus, in the face of declining capabilities ( land)� arid stable 
expectations (standard of living and a non-adaptive value structure) , the 
typical East-African farmer is confronted by stress induced by deprivation 
of the decremental variety. The result has been internal conflict within 
family and kin groups, with the consequences that these essential elements 
of Tanzania ' s  rural social structure are beginning to erode under the 
strain of land shortage. 
In the same manner, Mujib ' s  call for the establishment of one-party 
rule with supreme command under him was rejected by the democratic-minded 
people. His ideology of Mujibism created a negative response. 
CHAPTER IV 
PROBLEMS OF BUREAUCRACY 
The bureaucracy is an important element in the development pro-
cess. In a new country like Bangladesh where viable political institutions 
have not been developed bureaucracy plays a vital role. As Gerald A. Heegar 
remarks , "The growing role of governmental bureaucracy has been one of the 
most noted and discussed characteristics of developing political systems . "1 
For political develo�ment bureaucracy is an important instrument . The com-
plexity of issues in the modern state and the bureaucrat ' s  expertise or 
superior access to exl?ertise necessitates a greater role for bureaucracy in 
the initiation of .policy. 
The role of bureaucracy is very problematic. On the one hand , it 
should play a role in the execution of policy . On the. other hand , it should 
not play so much a role as to j eopardize the role of other institutions . It 
is very difficult to maintain a balance in the role of bureaucracy . The 
bureaucrats should play their par t ,  otherwise it will create problems in 
the administration. On the contrary its power should not be so much as to 
overrule other organizations of power . 
As a new-born country, Bangladesh faces problems oh both sides of 
the role of bureaucracy. Political and economic development cannot be 
achieved without a competent bureaucracy. Regardless of how lofty the 
1Gerald A.  Heegar, "Bureaucracy, Parties and Political Development,"  
World Politics,  July 1973,  pp. 600-601 . 
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goals of the regime or how adept it is at generating enthusiasm for its 
programs , policy decisions are not self-enforcing . It is the bureaucracy 
which must transform hopes into reality. 
Political development needs effective execution of public policy 
which requires an efficient bureaucracy. In the developing countries the 
bureaucracy plays a vital role, but is often plagued by many different 
problems . Monte Palmer has identified different problems of the bureau-
cracy . He mentions "(l) institutional and structural problems , (2) prob-
lems related to bureaucratic attitudes and behavior ,  (3)  the lack of inno­
vation and flexibilit y ,  and (4) problems of political intervention . 11
2 
The Bangladesh bureaucracy has a long tradition. It is the logical 
extension of the British and Pakistani bureaucracy. The major trend is 
that administration dominated East Bengali ' s  political environment from 
the beginning of the British days until the emergence of Bangladesh. "The 
dominant approach followed in the British days and lat.er in the Pakistan 
. 3 era to the problem of order and development was administrative . "  
In the British period , the bureaucracy was a tool for controlling 
the people .  The bureaucrats were trained to control rather than execute 
policy. The bureaucrats were used to be the sons of big landlords who used 
to work as a tool of the British government to control the people. In the 
Pakistani period , the bureaucracy had more influence than politics and poli-
ticians in the overall running of the country . Not only in the internal 
�onte Palmer , The Dilemmas of Political Development (Illinois : 
F .  E .  Peacock Publishers , Inc , ,  1967 . 
3A.  T .  R. Rahman , "Administration and Its Political Environment 
in Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs , Summer 1974 . 
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management of its sys tems , procedures and relationship but also in the 
decisions involving basic political , economic and social issues . The 
bureaucracy in association wich the military played a decisive role. 
Many senior bureaucrats moved into key ruling positions before Ayub 
imposed the first martial law. During the Ayub era , it was again the 
bureaucrats who played the major role in the national decision-making 
process . Things did not change much during Y'ahya ' s  regime although the 
military leaders allegedly set the outer limits of the influence that 
bureaucrats and other groups could exercise in the national system. The 
administration of the countryside for the whole Pakistan period was in 
the sole custody of btlceaucrats. 
The political environment was poorly organized . The ruling poli­
tical party did not have sufficient organization, skills and resources to 
provide a reasonable base for exercising effective control over the bureau­
cracy. Interest groups in the society were not organized to any degree . 
The dominant ruling model was the vice-regal system .and the experience in 
government of society was insignificant . Positively speaking, the admini­
stration maintained its basic colonial features--hierarchy of services, 
· limited and strict entry points for each service, elite character of sup-
erior services � ·:The . . struttruce . .  6f .. the :seriices provided the basic parameter 
for mobility, connnunication and control functions within the system and for 
negotiation, bargaining and advancement with external groups outside the · 
system. The control by the elite cadre was maintained by the-'Ulonopoly con­
trol of all key administrative positions and by claiming for its members a 
major invoI:vement.inithE new development institutions . "Thus the CSP secured 
60 percent representation in tli.e economic pool, . held key positions in the 
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planning commission and claimed a major share of the chairmanships and 
directorships of new public enterprises . The members of the bureaucracy 
obtained the lion ' s  share of fa.cilities often given through foreign aid 
to develop necessary skills, both within and outside the country so that 
they could do their new jobs well without depending on expertise from 
4 
such outside agencies as the universities . "  
"Pakistan as a society is extremely insecure. Within that society, 
however , the higher civil servants are as secure as rules , regulations and 
constitutions can make them . 115 They , in fact , fear disciplinary action 
less than most of their counterparts in the Wes t .  It follows that �any 
officers will devote less than full energy to their work, knowing their 
own position is secure. They may minimize the need for urgent action. 
This tendency is aggravated by the almost universal reluctance of a sub-
ordinate to tell his superior·:officer how bad things really are. Aecom-
plishments will be readily reported and exaggerated; failures will be 
covered up. Hence , all indications are that progress'.: is made and there 
is no need for special measures . To some exte�t this complacency might 
have been offset at the highest echelon by contract with the ministers and 
other related officials,  but in Pakistan these politicians frequently 
lacked the necessary grass roots contacts with the voters and were not 
too well informed themselves about local needs. 
The bureaucracy has no contact with the local people. The bureau-
crats have hardly any idea of the village people. The success of any pro-
4 Ibid . ,  p. 1 00 1 .  
5 Henry F. .  Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan (New Haven : Yale 
University Press, 1964) . 
gram depends on the cooperation of the villagers b ecause the policy is 
directed towards them . 
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The civil s ervice, the kingpin in the administration of Bangla­
desh is caught right in the middle of this drama of slow and painful 
emergence of a viable system in the new state. During the 1 2  years of 
military rule, the service, compos ed of trained government officials , 
provided a stabilizing factor, working in a kind of partnership with 
the army . For this reason, the citizens of the new state look upon it 
as a l egacy of the past. Bureaucracy , which has b een synonymous with 
civil service, is therefore a much hated word in the political dictionary 
of Bangladesh. 
Yet a large number of civil s ervants of former East Pakistan played 
another kind of role in the political struggle of their people. In the 
days of Ayub many of them openly sympathi z ed with the Awami League .and 
p ersonally remained on good terms with the Shiekh. Privately many of 
these civil s ervants provided the Awami League leadership with materials 
which helped the Sheikh to argue his case for autonomy of the province. 
Some wrote anonymously for political journals including the Forum to high-
light the economic disparity b etween the two wings of Pakistan. 
The officers who stayed in the country faced many troubles. Those 
who fled to India got quick promotion. The problem posed by officers who 
had once s erved with the provisional government in Calcutta had not been 
resolved even by April . "Later that month the government-owned Bangladesh 
News Agency released an official order directing the officers who were in 
the employment of c entral and provisional governments in Bangladesh on 
March 25, 1 97 1 ,  but were later recruited under Bangladesh (provisional 
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government) in Muiibnagar to go back to their posts they were holding on 
March 25, 1971 . But except in a few cases, this directive was never put 
into effect . 11
6 
In effect, a sense of drift inside the Secretariat continued right 
through the whole year . If the army officials could put up with arbitrary 
appointments and promotions, they felt thoroughly demoralized by the methods 
used to screen out the so-called undesirable, officials, including the for­
mer collaborators of Pakistani ' s  army rule, corrupt civil servants or any-
one who was allegedly guilty of inefficiency or gross misconduct . In 
September 1972 nearly ten months after the liberation, there was a kind 
of panic sweeping through the whole administration. 
The fundamental drawback of the planning commission is the lack 
of experience of its individual members in government planning . The other 
weakness of the commission is that its members have had no formal training 
in any kind of socialist planning . They have not seen any socialist eco­
nomy at work. Even in the:·_univet:sities where they studied , none of them 
had any specialized course in socialist planning . Moreover , the relation 
of the planning commission with the civil service is not cordial . The 
members of the planning commission were convinced in their mind that the 
entire senior cadre in the existing adm.inistration was out to sabotage the 
operation of the public sector . Having the status of State Ministers ,  i . e . , 
ministers without cabinet ranks , the members of the planning commission 
rightly considered themselves senior to the secretaries of the various 
departments. Unfortunately, even the Sheikh often gave the impression 
6s .  M .  Ali, After the Dark Past (Dacca, Bangladesh, 1973) . 
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that he -personally attached more importance to the secretaries while he 
could half-j okingly ref er to the members of the planning commission as 
"our professors , �.' , ·ori.:wor:se· .still, "our theoreticians . 117 
If the members of the planning commission adopted an unhelpful 
attitude on the question of creating administrative cohesiveness ,  the 
civil servants also never missed the opportunity of obstructing the work 
of the planning commission, sometimes out of spite, and sometimes their 
approaches differed . 
"One tragic casualty of this running feud between the planning com-
mission and the civil service was the U . S .  $320 million rehabilitation plan. 
The program, which covered a six-month period from January to June 1972, 
was prepared by the planning commission in late February and submitted to 
8 the Ministry of Finance for monetary sanction . "  In May a member o f  the 
planning commission complained that the top civil servants in the Ministry 
had not yet passed the program . This meant that during that crucial period 
the rehabilitation work was carried out on the basis of a series of ad hoc 
decisions which were totally unrelated to the priorities set forth in the 
draft program. 
Factionalism plagued the administration . First, there was a split 
between the Mujib-Nagar and Non-Mujib Nagar administration. In 1973 , a 
second sehism was added by the returnees from Pakistan. "The jockeying for 
position by the three groups undermined the coherence and efficiency of the 
services . "9 The morale of the services was already low because of their job 
7Ibid . ,  p .  201 . 
8 Ibid . ,  p .  204. 
9Rounaq Jahan , "Bangladesh in 1973 : Nation Building in a New State,"  
Asian Survey, Feb . 1977 • 
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insecurity. After liberation, the civil service of Pakistan was abol­
ished and in the absence of the new structure, the top bureaucrats felt 
insecure. Additionally, the civil services were used to : freedom from 
political control during the Pakistan days and found it difficult to 
adjust to the changed set up in a parliamentary system where they were 
placed under political leadership . 
The alienation of the civil bureaucracy was also caused by the 
enormous concentration of power in the hands of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman. 
His family members also regularly interfered with the civil servants for 
their personal ends and political purposes . It was impossible to get 
anything done without clearance from Bargabhavan, the official residence 
of Sheikh Mu}ib . Even routine matters were referred to him for approval . 
Senior officers spent more time waiting in line for his clearance than in 
implementing poliC:.ies . The inexperienced political appointees who flour­
ished in the post liberation period created a buff er between the senior 
bureaucrats and the Prime Minister which unnecessarily. complicated the 
decision-making process.  
There was growing frustration among the bureaucrats-':because many 
young civil servants who fled to India in 197 1 were given higher positions 
over the seniors .  A Services Reorganization Commission was set up, but 
its recommendations were unacceptable to various segments of the bureaucracy . 
The National Pay Commission' s  recommendations to fix the highest pay scale 
at Taka 2 ,000 per month was intensely disliked . Numerous technocrats. were 
brought in with such higher status and facilities that the civil servants 
felt uncomfortable about the incursion into their traditional positions . 
As a ,;esult , the�e. �s. tndt!i!�en.ce. and continued non-coopeJ;ation. inside. 
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the bureaucracy . While the misery of the salaried people increased , the 
political appointees prospered through government patronage openly dis­
tributed by the AL .  As economic conditions deteriorated , politicians 
started blaming the bureaucrats and even questioned their loyalty to the 
new state. Since decision making was monopolized by Sheikh Muj ib and his 
associates , the bureaucrats resented any attempt to lay blame at their 
doors . · 
In early 197 5 ,  when BKSAL , the one national party was announced , 
Sheikh Muj.ib called upon the civil servants to join the party. Following 
the British tradition, Bangladesh civil servants were non-political and 
they abhorred the very idea of joining the BKSAL. Most of them somehow 
avoided doing so until a coup overthrew Sheikh Mujib. 
This post-coup government is a partnership between the military 
and civil bureaucracy. The Council of Advisors consists of senior aca­
demecians , retired civil servants , and technocrats.  Ziaur Rahman restored 
the prestige of the civil servants. The regime arrested many civil ser­
vants who joined the BKSAL and downgraded those officials who were unduly 
promoted by Sheikh Mujib. Zia reinstated those officials who were dis­
tilissed Qy the AL .  He also took the initiative in restoring the confidence 
of the bureaucracy by formulating elaborate rules respecting seniority, 
qualifications and discipline . Steps were taken for the recruitment and 
training of young civil servants which had been lacking since 1972.  
After the coup on August 1 5 ,  1975 the power of the bureaucracy 
increased tremendously because the existing government is a coalition of 
the army and the bureaucracy . This created many problems of development 
by giving widespread power to the bureaucracy. As Fred · Riggs remarks , 
7 1  
"A phenomenon o f  the utmost significance in transitional societies is 
the lack of balance between policy making institutions and bureaucratic 
policy implementing structures . The relative weakness 9f political organs 
means that the political function tends to be appropriated in considerable 
measure by bureaucrats . Intra-bureaucratic struggles become a primary form 
of politics. But when the political arena is shifted to bureaucracies , · a  
shift marked by the growing power of military officers in conflict with 
civilian officials , the consequences are usually ominous for political 
stability, economic growth, administrative effectiveness and democratic 
1 0  
values . "  
The problem which Bangladesh is facing is the over-dominance of 
the bureaucrats who are obstructing the healthy .growth of the political 
institutions. The bureaucrats are controlling the affairs of the country 
from·�the Secretariat . Whatever policy decisions are taken are initiated 
by the bureaucracy which is creating excessive red tape within the system. 
The administration is centrally controlled by the bur�aucracy. The nucleus 
of the administration is the District, which is. headed by the Deputy Com-
missioner, who is generally a member of the civil service. He is the over-
all commander in the District Administration. He is responsible for main-
taining law and order, collection of revenue , trying cases, and administra-
tion of the District Board . In a nutshell, he is everything within the 
district.  The general leadership has no role in the administration of the 
district . There is no �ffective local government by the people .  
1 0  Fred W. Riggs , Bureaucracy and Political Development (New Jersey : 
Orinceton University Press, 1963) , p .  120. 
The next administrative unit is the Thana which is composed of 
some villages. The Thana is an administrative unit for maintaining 
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security within the Thana. It is headed by a police 'officer. There is 
no people ' s  representative in the Thana. 
The most basic unit of administration is the Union Counci l .  I t  
i s  composed of a chairman and some members who are elected by the people . 
But this elective body has virtually no power. Its main function is to 
distribute relief goods from within the villages. Local government is 
virtually non-existent. The policy is very much centralized . It is very 
difficult to get feedback on a particular policy as well as to execute 
any policy. The government policy is always without any reference to local 
needs and demands. In case of any emergency decision, the local institu-
tions have to wait for central authority to give direction to the policy . 
The dependence of development programs on foreign financial aid 
was unchanged. "Multi-lateral and bilateral teams from every maj or aid 
donor visited Bangladesh following the coups to reassess their roles. 
Total foreign assistance from 1972 to mid-1976 was $ 4 . 22 billion . After 
the coups the IlfF established a special trust for Bangladesh. The World 
Bank arranged an aid consortium meeting in Paris for �angladesh and the 
Islamic Development Bank, the International Development Association and 
the Asian Development Bank all announced maj or credits. While there were 
some integrated policy-making bodies , each program was usually the pre-
server of a separate ministry which guarded against attempts to coordinate 
implementation, thereby diluting its power . 11 1 1  Officials focused on poli-
1 1  Robert S .  Anderson, "Impressions of Bangladesh , "  Pacific Affairs, 
Fall, 1 9 7 6 .  
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cies which affected their own immediate urban environments and their own 
futures , not on the rural sector which they left when they began their 
careers . None of the portfolios for local self-government ,  rural develop­
ment or relief and rehabilitation were held by any of the military chiefs 
and their officials remained less prestigious and powerful than others. 
The weakness of local institutions for implementing development 
programs was due to their origins , composition and relation to their 
national government .  The Thana remained the maj or administrative unit 
for revenue, policy and development programs . The Union Councils con-
·tinued to be the focus of local attention. The Union Councils were dis­
credited under Mujib because they had been instruments of Pakistan and 
dis-credited under martial law because council members made p�ivate pro-
flt from relief distribution and government loans and contracts under 
Muj ib. "The pattern in one Thana and confirmed in four others was that 
chairmen of the Thana councils were living in the police station for pro­
tection, for going to their homes under guard in the daytime and running 
their offices by carrying their seals and s tamps in their pockets. 11 12 
Some frightened council members left the Thana to hide elsewhere . 
A powerful group was temporarily neutralized and in the e.ight months 
following the coups at least eight members of the Union Councils in this 
Thana were reported murdered. 
While they were the final link of the national gover�ment with the 
villages, these councils had no real power in development programming . 
Minor policing and taxing powers could be superceded by Thana or district 
officials if necessary. Council members look to these officials for favor 
12Ibid . , p .  896 . 
74 
in carrying out their responsibilities and cooperated with them in 
patronage and corruption. District government officials did not really 
identify with council members ·and continued to wear western-style dress , 
arrive at the villages in jeeps and depart before sunset.  The martial 
law administration hoped to inspire dedication among officials and set 
a new office-opening hour at 7 : 30 a .m. But this had been tried under 
Mujib and then as now few officials changed their daily routine and 
most arrived at 10 a . m .  at almost all levels of society. The conduct 
of government officials, though disliked, remained mostly unchallenged . 
The contradictions between development programs at the national 
and the local levels are not reconciled . Both senior military and civil 
officials were trained in Pakistan to believe that deference was the 
proper attitude of the people towards government authority. This con-
tinued in Bangladesh because there were no sustained training programs 
under Muj ib ' s  regime . Development programs from their perspective needed 
to be organized in tidy hierarchical and specialized. systems . The role 
of foriegn aid donors increased the need they. felt for separate account-
ability in spite of the use of the term integrated in policies.  Such needs 
were opposed to stronger local institutions which could experiment and 
learn which kinds of development would be effective in their areas. The 
national government did not transfer to the existing institutions any 
major responsibilities in development ,  such as revenue investment or 
resource control because this would constitute a potential challenge to 
national authority. "The politics of exhortation thus substituted for 
the transfer of real responsibilities and power in development programs . 11 13 
1 3  
Ibid . ,  p .  897 .  
The machinery of administration has no coordination with needs 
of society and the actual operation. For example, food policy, i . e . , 
administrations in Dacca (cap.ital) have consistently- chosen a food 
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policy which supplied priority groups on the official statutory rationing 
list of civil servants, military, police, industrial workers and hos­
pitals. This policy· guaranteed the health and strength of those urban 
dwelling classes or those on government salaries and cemented the alli­
ances between the bureaucracy, the military and the merchants who oper­
ated the food distribution system. Rural areas received under modified 
rationing only grains which were not absorbed by priority groups . At the 
times of the year when food was in short supply in the countryside, this 
was an example of punishing agriculture and rewarding industry. The same 
food policy tended to promote the growth of the bureaucracy and the mili­
tary which were ·still as in Wilcox ' s  terms , "the only two management 
instruments the society possesses . 11 14 
The government structure which controlled agricultural policy 
was highly centralized and remote from food p�oducers, though its insti­
tutions directed programs which were to some extent competing for recogni­
t ion and scarce resources. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Bangladesh 
Agricultural Development Corporation were j oined by two policy bodies 
resurrected from the days of Pakistan--the Agricultural Policy Council 
and the Rural Development Council. These were additions to the elected 
political agency of official rural development plans, the National Swan­
irvar Committee. Most of these bodies had interlocking memberships and 
represented alternate arenas for career building by ambitious members. 
14Ibid . , p .  901.  
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These bodies became more significant that the Integrated Rural Develop-
ment program which Mujib and foreign donors used as a channel for rural 
finance in which there were reports in February of promotion irregular-
ities at management levels . 
The Swanirbar movement was administered by Mahbub Alam Chashi 
from the President ' s  palace in Dacca and involved all district level 
offices in high-visibility rural work proj ects,  family p lanning and 
model development villages. It had to work through the rural power 
s tr,ucture and appeared to be a non-party mechanism for providing rewards 
or incentives to powerful villagers who were faithful to the government .  
The coup in Dacca was reflected by changes in recipients o f  rewards in 
the countryside. Despite some admirable pleas and rhetoric the Swanir-
bar movement at the Bangladesh Economic Association in March between 
Chashi and others included the charges that it reinforced the relief-
mentality and was just another method of agricultural input dumping 
15 
without accountabilities. The dual needs for s table· political rela-
tions down to the lowest level s ,  and for accountable implementation of 
programs could not always be reconciled. "The undefined term 11self-
reliance" was contrasted with the hierarchical though equally ambiguous 
term "rural uplift . 1116  Such needs and incongruous slogans were at the 
very heart of the politics of exhortation. The enthusiasm of the Swanir-
bar Committee for cooperation between civil servants generated resistance 
among those who were expected to share power and prestige with people of a 
similar role in other agencies and departments. 
15Ibid . ,  p .  904. 
16  Ibid . ,  p .  910.  
LACK OF ORGANIZED PARTY 
Lack of a well-organized party is also a problem of political 
development. A well-organized political party is necessary as a unifying 
force. It can marshall all the resources of the country into one direc-
tion, and mobilize people and the resources.  Most of the developing 
countries gained independence under the leadership of a well-organized 
party. If the party is factionalized, it i s  not possible to unite the 
nation into one ideology. "Most of the developing areas have at one time 
or another experienced at least brief periods in which two or more com-
peting political parties possessed reasonably equal chances of gaining 
control of the governmental apparatus through relatively fair elections. 
Rather.than promoting developmental goals, the impact of party competition 
has been largely debilitating. Physical contr�l by the central government 
over the human and material resources of the state has tended to weaken. 
Mobilization of the population towards the goals of economic and social 
development has tended to be fluctuating and sporadic . "
1 
M. Weip.er and J .  Lapalombara in their article, "The Impact of 
Parties on Political Development , "  discusses the different functions per-
formed by the political parties. They are political participation, mobili-
1 Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development (Illinois: Pea-
cock Publishers, Inc . , 1 9 7 1 ,  p .  1 1 5 .  
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zation, legitimacy , national integration, conflic t ,  management and poli-
2 
tical socialization . "  A political party opens the avenue for political 
participation. Through the po�itical party, people can place their demands 
on the political system. But one of the unfortunate problems of the devel-
oping areas is that the first generation of elites operating under party 
systems are confronted with participatory demands long before they have 
had a reasonable opportunity to institutionalize party government .  
The political party also performs the function of political 
mobilization but sometimes in the name of political mobilization, the 
politicil party supresses popular participation. The party government 
seeks to sanctify popular government and to associate itself with the 
populace. In fact, even the one-party state typically claims the mantle 
of democracy, that is, of popular rule, though a small oligarchy unaccount-
able for its actions may be in actual control of the government.  In the 
developing countries, to establish authority with legitimacy is also a 
serious problem. Political parties provide the rationale for establishing 
legitimate authority. The political party also. performs the function of 
national integration by bringing the desirable elements into one platform. 
It helps in the resolution of conflicts arising out of different groups .  
Political parties are also an instrument of political socialization. Its 
role as a socializing force is more predominant especially during the early 
phases of political development when they are among the few institutions 
concerned with affecting political attitudes. But these roles can be per-
formed well by a well-organized party. If the party is not well organized , 
it creates more problems rather than find solutions for them. 
2Myron Weiner and J .  Lapalombora, "The Origin and Development of 
Political Parties , "  in 
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Bangladesh is characterized by a multi-party system. But it 
lacks a well-organized 'party. If we are to understand the party system 
of Bangladesh, we should analyze briefly the party system in pre­
partitioned India. In British India, the two major political parties, 
Muslim League and the Congress, were organized on the basis of religion. 
For example, the Congress represented the Hindus and the Muslim League 
represented the Muslims. Thougl1 the present Bangladesh (formerly East 
Bengal) was separated from Pakistan , religion was the bond of unity 
among them. Accordingly , the Muslim League united the Muslims o f  East 
Bengal and the present Pakistan into one ideology, i . e . , separate home­
land for the Muslims. It led to the creation of Pakistan . 
Soon after the creation of Pakistan , East Bengal demanded autonomy 
because it was separated from Pakistan by one thousand miles . Moreover, 
East Bengal, which had a majority of population, was afraid of being dom­
inated by West Pakistan , which had a maj ority in the bureaucracy and the 
army. The Awami League came into existence in 1951 qS the spokesman of 
the provincial autonomy for East Pakistan . The Awami League was the most 
organized party till the creation of Bangladesh. Its six-point formula 
ultimately led to the establishment of Bangladesh. But after the creation 
of Bangladesh, the Awami League lost its attraction and ideology . It tried 
to unite the people under the ideology of Mujibism which failed to draw 
much attention. 
Different factions were fighting for different ideologies . The 
first open challenge occurred in May 1972 , when the Student League split 
into pro-Mujib groups and anti-Muj ib group on the basis of socialism or 
Mujibism. The advocates of scientific socialism later on formed the 
Jatiyo Samaj tantisk Dal. 
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There were several inherent contradictions within the Awami 
League . The popularity of the Awami League centered around Sheikh Muj ib 
who was the symbol of unity am�ng different factions . · He was ruling with 
his charisma. But later on, he found problems with his charisma . Accord-
ing to Max Weber ,  charisma is inherently unstable but its instability can 
be overcome by what he defines as "routinization of charisma, " a concept 
which exemplifies the process by which charisma is transformed from an 
extraordinary and purely personal relationship into an established author-
ity structure that is no longer necessarily dependent upon personal charis-
matic qualifications in the incumbent leader. 
This transformation can best be affected by what I .  L .  Horowitz 
calls "party charisma, a synthesis of practical political consideration 
and symbolically-laden personalist authority . 113 Charismatic leaders 
like Nasser, and Mujib ostensibly tried to routinize their charisma by 
strengthening their party but they always ended up weakening it . For 
example, periodic reshuffling of cabinets both by Mujib and Nasser weak-
4 
ened the party structure by creating power div�sions . 
Infighting within the charismat ' s own party also undermines the 
process of institutionalization. Both Nasser ' s Arab Socialist Union and 
Muj ib ' s  Awami League have suffered from internal conflict between rival 
party factions. In both cases the leader was considered by his party 
factions as an institution in himself which did not help the process of 
routinization. Instead, it widened the division within the party because 
3zillar Rahman Khan , "Leadership , Parties, and Politics in Bangla­
desh," Western Political Quarterly, March 1976.  
4rbid. 
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each faction vied for his support as happened in the Arab Socialist 
Union between radical communists and Islamic Socialists.  In Mujib ' s  
Awami League a split arose between the pro-Moscow socialists and pro­
Washington democrats. Khondokar Mushtaque , the Commerce Minister , 
believed to be pro-western and Tajaddin Ahmed, the Finance Minister, 
believed to be pro-Moscow. Ther.e was open rivalry among the different 
front organizations such as the Student League, Labor League, Youth 
League, and the Peasants League. Having failed to coordinate the 
different factions of the party and having failed to solve the country ' s  
economic problems, Mujib tried t o  mobilize the nation b y  the declaration 
of a one-party system, -the BKSAL. But it was mainly the Awami League. 
After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in the August 15 coup and the 
assassination of four leaders of the Awami League on November 3 ,  1975 in 
Dacca Central Jail, the party was left with no leadership. 
Khondokar Mushtaque Ahemd became the President of Bangladesh with 
the backing of the many who were involved in the August 1975 coup. He was 
alleged by the Awami Leaguers as conspiring for the coup because he was 
dissatisfied with Mujib ' s  pro-Soviet-Indian policy. However, he was over­
thrown in the November 3 coup. Later on he formed the Democratic League. 
He tried to attract many Awami Leaguers who refused to join his party. 
He is now undergoing imprisonment under the Zia government for his alleged 
corruption. 
The death of Sheikh Mujibar created a vacuum in his party. There 
was constant rivalry between different personalities and groups .  There was 
a constant danger of a split within the party. The split came on August 
12, 1978. A new central committee was announced� headed by Mr. Mizanur 
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Rahman Chowdhury. The other group is headed by Abdul Malek Ukil and 
Abdur Razzak .  There are two groups within the Awami League. One group 
believes in one-party presiden�ial rule and the other· believes in multi-
party parliamentary system. Hizanur Chowdhury said, "that they believed 
in the pure parliamentary form of government. But the other group 
believed in the one·-party presidential form of government11 5 Mizanur 
Rahman also blamed the other group for confusing Sheikh Mujibar Rahman . 
He also remarked that he was opposed to the formation of the one-party 
rule under the BKSAL. 
Another faction from the Awami League was led by General M. A. G .  
Osmani,  who was opposed to Shiekh Mujib ' s  one-party rule. He left the 
Awami League and refused to join the BKSAL . When political parties were 
opened up, he formed the Janata Party. His party ' s  main principle was 
the establishment of parliamentary democracy, safeguard of fundamental 
right s.  He contested the June 3 election as a nominee o'f Gono Oikko Jote 
(People ' s  United Front) which was composed of different parties, but he 
was defeated by Ziaur Rahman. 
President Ziaur Rahman opened up a new political party, Bangla­
desh Jutiyatabadi Dal (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) . He emphasized ( 1 )  
firm mass unity inspired and consolidated on the basis o f  Bangladeshi 
nationalism of mass-oriented politics, (2) national economic emancipation, 
self-reliance and progress achieved through the united and well-disciplined 
efforts of the people, but his party is also centered around him. 
The Nat ional Awami Party led by Maulana Bhasani until his death in 
1977 lacked an efficient organization. It was intrigued with so many 
srbid. 
factions. Moreover,  all the radical parties assembled there under the 
shadow of Bhasani. He professed I slamic socialism, but he could not 
specifically mention the meani�g of Islamic socialism; The people 
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think of his Islamic socialism in the same way as Bhutto ' s  I slamic 
socialism. There was infighting between Kazi Zafar Ahmed , the General 
Secretary and Mashiur Rahman , the Vice-President.  Kazi Zafar Ahmed 
later on, in collaboration with Captain (Rtd . )  Abdul Halim Chowdhury 
formed the United People ' s  Party, which believed in establishing social­
ism within the country. Soon after factionalism started between Kazi 
Zafar Ahmed and Captain Abdul Halim Chowdhury. The United People ' s  
Party led by Abdul Halim Chowdhury decided to j o in Jatiyota Badi Dal of 
President Ziaur. This created anger among Kazi Zafar and other leaders 
of the UPP, which expelled Captain Halim and others who j oined the 
Jatiyota Badi Dal; 
Another faction from the NAP (Bhashani) was led by Dr . Aleem Al 
Raj ee, who was the Vice-President of the NAP (Bhashan�) .  He lost to 
Moshiur Rahman in ascendency of power in the NA;p which led to the creat ion 
of the Bangladesh People ' s  League under the leadership of Dr. Aleem Al 
Raj ee. 
The NAP , headed by Mr. Mashiur Rahman, has decided to merge with 
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Ziaur Rahman . Still there was some 
opposition from a group led by Anwar Zahid , who -- mo�ed a separate reso­
lution opposing the decision of Mr. Mashiur Rahman , but he was supported 
by only 29 out pf 1300 votes for Rahman . 
The National Awami Party (Muzzaf far) led by Professor Muzzaf far 
Ahmed, and the Bangladesh Connnunist Party led by Moni Singh, have the 
same ideological background , i . e . , establishment of the Soviet-type of 
socialism. During the reign of Sheikh Muzib they worked as a team of 
the Awarni League showing constant signs of support for pro-Soviet­
Indian policy. 6 This has been very much discredited by the people 
because of their die-hard pro-Soviet policy. 
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The Jatiyo Samaj tartnik Dal (JSD} came into existence as a result 
of antagonism between the Awami League because of its insistence on 
Muzibism. The JSD believe in the establishment of scientific socialism. 
The JSD is led by Maj or (Rtd . )  Abdul Julil, a liberation hero and A. S .  M .  
Abdur Rab , a student leader, both o f  whom were arrested by the present 
regime for alleged creation of disturbance within the country. 
"The JSD, which believes that the Bangladesh liberation war was 
stopped just as it was about to become a real people ' s  war, opposes the 
nationalist leadership who it says represents only 8 percent of the people 
7 
but own 85 percent of the national wealth . "  I t  considers itself to be 
the supporting force of a correct proletarian organiz�tion, the Bangladesh 
Communist League (BCL) . I t  is an underground party led by the former Stu-
dent League leader , Siraj ul Alam Khan . He managed to get most of his 
followers trained in guerrilla warfare during the independence war and has 
since worked behind the scenes to bring about the splits in the Awami 
League group that led to the formation of the JSD. The BCL publishes a 
daily newspaper, Gomokanta (Voice of the People) , which is edited by the 
well-known radical poet, Al-Mahmud, 
6Th:e · Bangladesh Observer, August 1 3 ,  1978.  
7TaJ.ukdaT Mariruzzaman, "Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution , "  
Journal o f  Asian Studies, August 1 9 7 5 .  
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The BCL, influenced by the Marxist ideas, analyzes the situation 
in Bangladesh in terms of inherent contradictions.  The BCL sees three 
stages in the struggle for soc�alism of which the first two were achieved 
by the end of the 1971  liberation war . Remaining, however, is the third 
stage in which the contradiction between the ruling elite--the Awami 
League--and other agents of imperialism and the proletariat ,  will be 
resolved by a violent revolution. Parliamentary politics is seen as a 
means of perpetuating the rule of the exploiting classes, including 
feudal elements ,  intermediaries, and the rising middle class. 
The BCL hopes that at a certain stage, China will come to sympa­
thize with ts revolution, but it resists following any communist inter­
national line. There is a friendly tenor in its attitude toward pro­
Chinese Marxist-Lenist parties. It is attempting to expand its member­
ship and is supposed to have recruited most of the company commanders of 
the Mukti Bahini and the district and sub-divisional commanders of the 
Mukti Bahini. The members are being formed into cel�s j o ined by an under­
ground newspaper, Lal Ishtehar (Red Bulletin) . The main leader , Sirajui 
Alam Khan, is also arrested now. 
Another radical opposition party is the Bangladesh Communist Party 
Leninbadi (the Communist Party of Bangladesh-Leninist--BCP (L) . This party 
originated with four of the five groups of pro-Chinese communists that 
made up the Somonnoy (consultative) Committee formed in Calcutta during 
the period of liberation: ( 1 )  the Coordination Committee of the Communist 
Revolutionaries, (2)  East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) 
EPCP (M-L) , led by Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam, (3) some communists of Khulna 
led by Drs. Marouf Hossain and Sayeddur Dahar, and (4) some communists led 
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by Nasim Ali Khan. The leaders of these groups thought that the exist­
ence of so many communist parties in East Pakistan had prevented the left 
from playing the leading role in the liberation of Bangladesh and they 
issued a call for unification to complete their country ' s  trancated 
revolution. In order to achieve this goal, they formed a new party 
BCP (L) . 
The BCP(L) adopted the strategy of working partly as an open 
organization and partly as a secret party. The open section of the party 
is led by Amal Sen, Nazral Islam, Nasim Ali Khan and others. The BCP (L) 
has also formed a Student Front (Bangladesh Biplobi Chatra Union-Revolu­
tionary Students'  Union) and a Labor Front (the Bangla Sramik Federat ion 
Bengal Labor Federation) and some of its members are working through the 
National Awami Party .(Bhasani Group) and its peasant organization as well.  
The names of the leaders of the underground sector of the party are not 
known , but it is said to have established cells in three-fourths of Bangla­
desh' s  districts. 
The ideology of the BCP(L) has much in �ommon with that of the BCL . 
Both believe that the revolution in Bangladesh is unfinished because the 
bourgeosie were able to assume leadership of the nationalist struggle, that 
Russian communism is revisionist and Russia ' s  intentions in Bangladesh is 
imperialistic and that India is also a potential imperialist power . "How­
ever, the BCP (L} opposes violence such as that used by the Naxalites · in 
India, whom it considers anti-Leninist because they are so undisciplined . 118 
The BCP(L) does not have a mass front such as the JSD and its student and 
labor fronts are weak; so it does not have the appeal of the Communist 
League. 
8Ibid . ,  p .  756. 
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Despite the fact that the BCP (L) was formed in order to unify 
the left, it is experiencing conflict within its own ranks as well as 
with those fa�tions of the Ea�t Bengal Communist Party and the East 
Pakistan Communist Party that did not choose to unite with the other 
groups in the first place. Within the BCP (L) there is dissention 
between those who chose to work within the National Awami Party (Bhas­
hini) and its preasant organization and those who feel this is con­
sorting with the enemy. The conflict between the communists who work 
in the NAP (B) and the non-communist members has also paralyzed the 
working of that party. In the council meeting of February , 1974 , the 
two groups clashed and Bhashani was forced to postpone the session and 
to dissolve the central committee. 
The fifth group that had belonged to the original Somonnoy Com­
mit tee, but did nbt join the BCL(L) was the East Bengal Communist Party 
(Marxist-Leninist) led by Deven Sikdar and Abul Bashar. For example , the 
Sikdar-Bashar group saw the oppression of Bangladesh .By West Pakistan as 
more direc t ,  the present position of India as �ore dominant within the 
country and the Chinese Communist Party as more a political leader of 
Bangladesh ' s  struggles than did the BCP (L) members. The Sikdar-Bashar 
group , now called the Banglar Communist Party (communist party of Benga l ,  
BCP) also has an open and an underground section, a student front and a 
labor front.  It regards participation in parliamentary parties as a 
strategy rather than a matter of basic principle. The leadership of the 
BCP comes from peasant and working class families and is without much 
formal education. This is in stark contrast to the BCP (L) leaders, who 
are generally upper class and university educated. It is these differ-
ences in background and attitudes of leaders and cadres that differen­
tiates the two parties, not their minor ideological incompatibilities. 
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The Bangladesh Commun�st League, the BCP(L) and the BCP have 
adopted the tactics of working through both party cells and mass front 
organizations. However, there are four more revolutionary parties that 
work only through their underground cells and underground armed fronts .  
Of these two and factions of a group that joined the Somonnoy Committee 
--the East Pakistan Communist Party, one is a faction of the East Bengal 
Communist Party from which Sikdar and Bashar split to form the BCP and 
one is apparently quite separate in its origins from any of these. 
The latter is the SarboharP. Party (Purba Bangla Sarbohar.a Party-­
East Bengal Communist Party) which grew out of the East Bengal workers'  
Movement .  The leadership of the Sarbohara Party is generally university 
educated, which may account for in part the fact that the party has been 
the most prolific of all Bangladesh ' s  revolutionary parties in publishing 
party literature. In addition to Lal Jhanda (Red Fl�g) and Sangbad Bulle­
tin (news bulletin) , the party regularly publi�hes the proceedings of the 
meetings of its central committee and numerous other pamphlets .  
The Sarbohara Party agrees with the others that the Bangladesh 
revolution was stopped too soon, with the Awami League serving as a puppet 
government of Inida, which has plundered East Bengal and has maintained 
its military presence there through arming, training and even clothing 
the vigilante group--the Rakhi Bahini. Russian and American imperialism 
are also seen as threats. They even claim that the nationalist revolution 
has not yet been completed; the JSD is held to be making a Trotskyist error 
in trying to complete the socialist revolution before the nationalist one. 
89 
However, the bourgeois leadership of the Awami League cannot be truly 
nationalistic, as they draw their support from imperialist powers and 
semi-feudal countries ; only the' party of the proletariat can pursue the 
revolution correctly. In order to accomplish the revolution, the Sar­
bohara Party has formed a National Liberation Front including peasants ,  
workers and oppressed linguistic Biharis and members of the Chakma . and 
Santal tribes. 
Because Bangladesh is surrounded on three sides by India, the 
Sarbohara theoreticians are concerned that no outside help will be avail-· 
able for the revolution that the liberation front will have to depend on 
its own resources . It has launched a "liberation war'' procuring funds 
and arms forcibly from pro-government. sources. The National Awami Party 
(Bhashani) is supporting it in this respect .  The party appears to have 
recovered from its heavy losses of fighters to both the Pakistan army and 
the lfoj ib Bahini, and it claims responsibility for most of the police 
station lootings, bank robberies , and river dacoities. perpetuated since 
libera tion. I t  also claims to have taken the lives of several Awami 
League workers, smuggler s ,  betrayers of party secrets and some Hindus who 
were said to be still oppressing Muslims. The geurrilla units lie low 
during the winter and are most active during the rainy season, when govern­
ment troops are at the greatest disadvantage. 
The Communist Party of East Bengal (Marxist-Leninist) is another 
underground revolutionary party, more commonly known as the Sammobadi Dal. 
It is led by Mohammad Toaha and Sukhendu Dastidar, who brought about the 
split in the original East Pakistan Communist Party in .1968 and formed its 
pro-Peking wing. Toaha collected a number of red geurrillas to fight both 
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the Pakistan army and the Mukti Bahini,  but these were decimated by the 
opposing forces and were unable to set up their projected People ' s  Demo-
cratic Republic of Bangladesh. After independence tneir newspaper, 
Gono Shakti (People ' s  Strength) , began to subscribe to the common theory 
that Bangladesh had not really been liberated but was headed by a puppet 
government responsible to India and thus indirectly to .Moscow . Like the 
Sarbohara Party, the Sammobadi Dal regards the Rakhi Bahini as essenti-
ally an Indian army in Bangladesh receiving arms· and ammunition from the 
Indian government and taking direct aid from Indian armed forces to sup-
press rebels in the Chittagong Hill tracts and other areas in March 1972 . 
Also like the Sarbohara Party, the Sammonadi Dal has formed a national 
liberation front under its direction and a guerrilla force recruited from 
among frustrated freedom fighters. Their main activities center in the 
districts of Raj shahi, Pabna, Dacca, Mymensingh, Faridpur and Noakhali . 
Some of the differences among the parties can be seen from the 
ways in which they criticize each other. "The Sammobadi Dal criticizes 
the BCP(L) and the BCP for their stands on imperialism since the latter 
two parties have supposedly given their support to the Awami League by 
saying that it was dependent on India rather than terming it a ' puppet 
9 
government . ' " The Sarbohara Party is dismissed as a mere terrorist group 
misled by the upstart Sikdar into seeing the most important contradiction 
as that between East Bengal and India rather than between socialist and 
anti-socialist forces. For this reason, the Sammobadi Dal thinks that the 
Sarbohara Party might be acting as a counter-revolutionary terrorist force, 
9rbid . ,  p .  778. 
patronized by the U . S .  in its attempt to oust Delhi and Moscow from 
Bangladesh. Similarly, the JSD, which is regarded as a mere falling 
out over patronage among j uniqr AL members, is thought to be supported 
by India as a counterweight to keep Mujib ' s  puppet government under 
strict control. 
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While most of the members of the East Pakistan Communist Party 
(Marxist-Leninist) formed the Sammobadi Dal under Toaha and Dastidar, a 
small section under Abdul Hoq, retained the old name of the party and a 
separate organization. This group is the most extreme in its interpre-
tation of the liberation struggle; it does not recognize the existence 
of Bangladesh at all, preferring to see the war of independence as an 
expansionist move by India and the country now as a colony of India. 
The EPCP(M-L> has therefore launched its own people ' s  war against the 
counter-revolutionary forces to resurrect East Pakistan. However ,  because 
of its continued use of the name "East Pakistan" it has been the subject 
of the strongest government action, and most ot the cadres have been 
killed or jailed. Abdul Hoq remains at large • .  
The East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) EBCP (M-L) is 
the last of the underground parties. It is itself split into three groups , 
one of which, the group led by Sikdar and Bashar , joined the Sommony Com­
mittee to form the BCL. A second group led by Matin and Alauddin saw the 
liberation struggle as a f ight between two "bourgeois dogs" and adopted 
the line of ·killing and the class enemies from the Pakistan army through 
feudal landlords to the Mukti Bahini. 
lO 
This group then came under heavy 
lOrbid . ,  p .  782. 
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attack by the Mukti Bahini after December 1 6 ,  197 1 ,  and it fled from 
Pabna to Attrai which was at that time under the control of Ohidur 
Rahman . He was persuaded to a�mit the error of supporting the Mukti 
Bahini and his group was recruited to the EBCP(M-L) . Their terrorist 
activities led to reprisals by the government in a s eries o f  hard­
fought battles . Both Motin and Ohidur Rahman were captured . Alauddin, 
who escap�d , is continuing publication o f  Purbo Bangla (East Bengal) , 
the party ' s  newspaper. 
The EBCP(M-L) theoreticians ' .analysis of Bangladesh ' s  political 
situation is similar to that of the Sammobadi Dal, but the former put 
more emphasis on the contradiction between peasants and feudal elements , 
claiming nationalism cannot b e  achieved without a class struggle as wel l .  
They also seek collaboration with the revolutionaries in India , especially 
the Naxalites , who are distrusted by the other revolutionary parties of 
Bangladesh . The EBCP(M-L) is active in Attrai and in parts of Rajshahi, 
Dinaj pur , Pabna and Kushtia districts . 
The left revolutionary parties of Banglpdesh are agreed that the 
war for independence left the revolution unfinished . There .ar.e. not so 
many differences among these parties. Some differences of style and 
emphasis can be traced to the class origins of the members and their 
levels of education. Most of the factionalism is due to the result of 
personal animosities, desire for personal aggrandizemen t ,  accidents of 
geography , of history , and the groups encounters with the Pakistan army 
and Mukti Bahini. They are not worried about the growth of so many 
parties because they regard the s ituation as similar to Russia before 
the October Revolution when there were s everal communist parties . They 
feel that the party with the correct strategy will ultimately lead the 
revolution. 
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There are so many par.ties in Bangladesh that· it threatens the 
stability of the country. None of the parties are well organized to 
mobilize the people under one ideology. The parties are generally fra­
gile. The main causes of too many parties are the personality conflict s ,  
politics based on personality , too much influence on ideology . If we 
analyze the factionalism within the party, we find it is based on person­
ality rather than ideology. For example, Ataur Rahman and Sheikh Mujibar 
Rahman could not tolerate each other . That is the reason why Ataur Rahman 
formed a new party . The main difficulty with the personality-based party 
is that if , in any way, that personality is lost , it loses the party. 
There is a tendency in Bangladesh to recognize the party by leader rather 
than by the party . This tendency led to the coming up of many parties . 
none of which are strong enough to form a maj ority. Government is bound 
to be formed by the coalition of different parties, .wbich starts rivalry 
after assuming power . This is what happened iµ Pakistan. This was the 
m ain reason for the failure of the parliamentary system in 1958 -nd the 
coming of martial law . 
In the June 3 election there was also a kind of coalition of parties 
such as Gono Oikko Jote (Peopl e ' s  Union) which was a coalition of the Awami 
League, National Awami Party (Muzaffar) , Bangladesh Communist Party, Jatiyo 
Janata Party. The Gono Oikk.o Jote nominated General Osmani as the pi?esi­
dential candidate. Th- other coalition is the Jatiyatabadi Front (Nation­
alist Front) composed of the Jatiyatabadi Gonotantrik Dal , the NAP (Bha­
shani, the United People's  Party� the Banglades� Labor Party, the Bangla-
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desh Muslim League, and the Bangladesh Tapshil Federation. The coalition 
nominated Ziaur Rahman, who emerged victorious . He now faces the problem 
of distributing patronage among the coalition members;  Moreover, it is 
very difficult to integrate the diverse elements into a coherent policy, 
because every party tries to maintain its separate identity . Ziaur Rahman 
very recently disbanded the coalition and is trying to organize the Jati-
yatabadi Dal by encouraging others to merge with his own party . 
Too much influence and insistence on ideology also creates faction-
alism within the party. For example, scientific socialism and Mujibism 
which led to the breaking up of the Awami League and the coming up of JSD. 
There is no effective way within the party for the solution of conflicts. 
There is no organized interest group to articulate the interests of the 
people .  The parties have no organizational base in the rural areas where 
the majority of the people live. The general people are unconcerned about 
party politics . Only during election time do party leaders become active 
for gaining popular support, which is completely base� on demogogu�ry . . Mos.t 
of the groups are anomic groups who are utilized by the politicians for 
satisfying their own desires . Because of the poor aggregation of interest 
of the people, the demands are unheard , which creates problems in the 
input and output sector of the govenrment . 
Following Duverger ' s  classification of political parties , we may 
present a typology of the political parties of Bangladesh in the following 
1 1  
table. The politicaL.parties o f  Bangladesh do not differ very much in 
their organizational structure. Minor differences with ideology leads to 
1 1  
M�urice Duverger , Political Parties (New York : John Wiley & 
Sons , Inc . , 1955) , pp. 4-5. 
TABLE 1 
Typology Qf Partl�_§____Q_f__Bangladesh 
Party 
Caucus 
Awami League 
NAP 
(P ro-Russia) 
NAP 
(Bhashani) 
Jatiyatabadi Dal 
Janata Party 
"JSD 
Bangladesh 
Communist 
League 
Bangladesh 
Communist 
Party (Leninist) 
East Pakistan 
Organization 
Branch-Cell 
Branch 
Branch 
Branch 
Branch 
Branch 
Branch & Cell 
Cell 
Cell & Branch 
Communist Party 
(Marxist-Leninist)  Cell 
East Bengal 
Communist Party 
Bangaldesh 
Communist Party 
Sammobadi Dal 
East Bengal 
Communist Party 
Cell & Branch 
Cell 
Cell 
(Marxist-Lenini�t) Cell 
Banglar 
Articulation 
Weak 
Weak 
Weak 
Weak 
Weak. 
S trong 
Very Strong 
Very S trong 
Very Strong 
Very Strong 
Very Strong 
Very Strong 
Very Strong 
Communist Party _ Cell & Branch Very Strong 
Source : · Maurice Duverger, Political Parties 
Link 
Horizontal 
or Vertical 
Vertical 
Vertical 
Vertical 
Vertical 
Vertical 
Horizontal 
Horizonfal 
Horizontal 
Horizontal 
Horizontal 
Horizontal 
Horizontal 
Horizontal 
Horizontal 
Centralized 
or 
Decentralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Centralized 
Party Membership 
Cadre, Mass or 
Devotee 
Mass 
Mass 
Mass 
Mass 
Mass 
Mass 
Mass 
Devotee 
Devotee 
Devotee 
Devotee 
Devotee 
Devotee 
Centralized Devotee 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc . ,  1955) . 
'° 
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the growth of other parties.  The moderate political parties like the 
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Awami League, NAP (Bhashani) , the Ja�ata Party , the Jatiyatabadi Dal , 
all work in branches and articulation is not very strong. Their rela-
tionship with the other branches has a subordinate relationship to the 
central party organization. These parties are strictly controlled from 
the center . The policies come as hierarchical orders from the center. 
All these parties appeal to the general mass for support . The radical 
parties like the JSD, Bangladesh Connnunist Party, and the East Bengal 
Communist Party are organized into branch.es.,� and cells. These radical 
parties are strong in articulation, and have a horizontal relationship 
with other branches because they give equal footing to their fellow 
organizations · based on cells or branches . Only the JSD comes closer to 
the mass party because of its. appeal to· :the· populace as a whole. All 
other leftist parties like the Bangladesh Communist League, East Paki-
stan Communist Party(Marxist-Leninist) , Banglar Communist Party , Sammobadi 
Dal , and the East Bengal Communist Party(Marxist-Leninist) are character-
ized by cells, strong articulation , horizontal relationship with their 
supporting organizations , highly centralized and mem�ership is very closed 
to the devotee party. 
Analyzing the party system in Bangladesh, we may classify 1.t. in 
the words of Duverger as "polypartism or the tendency to extreme multi-
plication of parties which can be explained by general causes that are 
rather variable.111 2  Many parties have emerged out of many reasons 
although Bangladesh is a homogeneous entity. The causes of the emergence 
of many parties are factionalism, worship of personality, too many ideolo-
gies, etc. 
i· 2 Ibid . , p .  245 . 
CHAPTER VI 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
The fundamental problem of political development is economic 
development . For a sound political system a sound economic system is 
an urgent necessity. Economic problems create frustrations among the 
people leading to lnstability and disorganization within the system. 
Problems of economic development are at the very root of politics. 
The economic disparity bewteen East and West Pakistan is responsible for 
the disintegration of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh . If  we 
try to analyze the problems of stability , unity and integration, eco-
nomic problems lie at the root of many political problems . The coup 
of 1975 that killed Sheikh Muj ibar Rahman was due to the failure of 
Mujib to solve the economic problems of Bangladesh. 
The economy of Bangladesh is completely undeveloped . In the 
post-liberation period she had to suffer the problem of reconstruction 
of the damages during the liberation struggle. A U . N .  report estimated 
'�the cost of reconstruction in Bangladesh at $938 million. Production in 
all sectors of the economy declined sharply . The jute industry output 
was 28 percent less than 1969-70 production. Exports were estimated to 
be 30 percent less than normal requirements . 111 
lJaast Faaland , and J .  R.  Parkinson, Bangladesh: The Test Case 
of Development ( Colorado:  Westview Press,  1976) , p .  46 . 
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In the first two years after independence, war-ravaged Bangladesh 
was able to avoid a major economic crisis and a large-scale famine mainly 
because of the massive relief operations carried on by the United Nations 
Relief Organization in Bangladesh (UNROB) in December 1973.  
The nationalization of industry was also a complete failure. The 
immediate result was chaos and confusion. While the so-called abandoned 
properties were placed under government-appointed administrators , who in 
most cases turned out to be political nominees , the big blunder of the 
government was to embark on the nationalization program without setting 
up the institutional fr�mework to implement it.  It has been criticized 
by Badaruddin Umar as "to introduce nationalization without setting up 
the institutional framework is a simple case of putting the cart before 
the horse."2 In most of the nationalized industries the adminis trators 
appointed by the government were the AL workers who had no knowledge of 
either a socialist or capitalist system. The administrators grew rich 
over night by smuggling machinery and raw materials .�o India. 
Another important reason for the economic crisis was the large­
scale smug5 l.ing of relief good s ,  foodstu�fs , and jute to India. The 
unequal real value between the Bangladesh taka and Indian rupee were 
exchanged at par shortly after liberation; but officially it is equal 
to 50 Indian ruppees . The smugglers sell essential commodities to Indian 
businessmen and in return bring cheap nonessential consumer goods worth 
double the amount of Bangladesh taka . "During the 1972-74 financial year 
an estimated 1 . 5  million tons of paddy and 800,000 tons of rice were 
2s .  M. Ali, After the Dark Past (New Delhi : Thompson Press,  Ltd . ,  
1973) . 
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reported smuggled to India . 113 While the economy of Bangladesh was on the 
point of collapse the s ituation was further aggravated by the worst flood 
in July and August 1974 which, according to the estimate of the planning 
commission, caused damage to "more than 1 million tons of food grains and 
10 to 15  million dollars worth of Jute exports . The price of goods 
4 increased by 700-800 percent compared to 1969-70 levels . "  
The most important o f  all these problems is the population problem. 
It is creating pressure on the land, resources , and the food suppl y .  With 
the rise of population the unemployment is also increasing, causing frus-
trations . and leading to disgruntled elements in the population. Frus trated, 
these disgruntled people are joining the radical parties causing violence 
and threatening the stability of the country . The U .  N .  Bulletin of 
Statistics for Asia and the Pacific, Vol. Vil, No . 2 ,  June 1977 , gave the 
following projection of the population in Bangladesh, Pakistan, · India and 
Sr . Lanka . (See Table 2 , following page . )  
I n  Bangladesh 7 babies are born every minute, . 3 . 7  million every 
year; about 1 . 3 3  million die yearly ,  thus , 2 . 37  million people are being 
added to the total population. The birth rate is 47 per 1000 per year . 
Therefore, the rate of increase is 30 per 1000 or 3 percent and at the 
rate of natural increase it will take only 23 years to reach 156 million 
from the present number . 5 In India, the birth rate is probably about 40 
3Talukdar Maniruzzaman ,  ''Bangladesh in 1975 : The Fall of Mujib 
Regime and Its Aftermath , "  Asian Survey, February, 1976 . 
4 Jaast Faaland , and J .  R. Parkinson, .££.· c it . ,  p .  7 9 .  
5 
Md . Shah Jahan, "Population Boom and Food Production , "  The Bangla-
desh Observer, September 1 7 ,  1978.  
TABLE 2 
Population Growth in Bangaldesh and Neighboring Countries 
Latest Census Estimate of Midyear PoEulation (millions) 
Area 
Square 
Country Kilometers Date Population 1937 1963 1971  1972  1973 1974 1975 1976 
Bangladesh 142 , 998 1/3/74 7 1 ,  4 79'  071  ---- 5 3 . 2 1  6 9 . 7 7  7 1 .  4 7  7 3 . 2 1  7 4 . 99 7 6 . 82 78 . 66 
India 3 , 287, 782 1/4/71  548 , 159, 652 303 . 63 462 . 03 551 . 07 562 . 9 1  574 . 8 1  596 . 66 598 . 4 3  6 1 0 . 08 
Pakistan 796, 095 6/9/72 6 5 , 309, 340 ---- 4 5 . 4 7  6 2 . 43 64 . 30 66 . 23 6 8 . 2 1  70 . 2 1  7 2 . 37 
Sri Lanka 6 5 , 6 10 9/10/ 7 1  12 , 7 1 1 , 143 S . 7 3  1 0 . 6 5  1 2 . 6 1  1 2 . 86 13. 10 1 3 . 28 1 3 . 5 1  1 3 . 7 3 
Source: Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics for Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI , No . 4 ,  December 
1976 (New York: United Nations) , p .  20.  
...... 
0 
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and the death rate was thought to b e  16;  over 12 million people were 
added to the Indian population each year between 1965 and 1970 . The 
growth rate in Pakistan averaged 2 . 5  percent per year during 1965-1970 . 6 
Though the above mentioned countries are overpopulated, Bangladesh exceeds 
all the neighboring countries in population growth. 
With over 45 percent of the population under the age of 1 5 ,  a 
nearly 3 percent rate of natural increase and a dependency burden not 
far from unity, the result is an indisputable burden of absolute numbers 
combined with virtually unaltered and enormous potential for further 
growth. "Population density in Bangladesh ' s  55 ,000 square miles of ter:.. 
7 rain would b e  2 . 841 persons per square mil e . "  
Th.e rapid rise of the population is due to the early marriage in 
Bangladesh. Nearly 50 percent of the women in the age group between 1 2  
8 and 14 are married and about 90 percent of those aged 1 5  to 1 9 .  Family 
planning is insufficient . In the villages , people are opposed to birth 
control.  The lack of education stands in the way o f  proper implementation 
o f  family planning . Religion may b e  an obstacle to the adoption of family 
planning. Hafez Zaidi, in his study, emphasized the importance of super-
stition as well as religious teaching and concludes that 99 percent of the 
Muslims and 98 percent of the Hindus believe that man has no control over 
the means of livelihood . 9 It is assigned by God. What is written in his 
forehead wd.11 determine his destiny. 
6c .  Stephen Baldwin, "Catastrophe in Bangladesh : An Examination of 
Alternative Population Growth Possibilities 197 5-2000 , "  Asian Survey, 
February, 1977 . 
7Jaast Faaland and J .  R.  Parkinson , �· cit . ,  p .  84. 
8rbid . ,  p .  85. 
9rbid. , p .  87 . 
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Due to the rise of population, Bangladesh has become a food defi-
cit area. Agriculture is the mainstay o f  economic life in Bangladesh. 
"As much as 90 percent of the total population 
live in rural areas . Over 80 percent o f  all 
employment is in agriculture ;  about 60 percent 
of the national product is derived from agri­
culture ; 90 percent o f  national exports are 
either agricultural or manufacturers of them. 
As land area cannot be expanded its use must 
be optimized . Expansion of new human settle­
ment is forcing Bangladesh to lose about 28 
percent of her 2 . 5  milliom acres of cultiv­
able land every decade worsening the chronic 
food probl:em . 111 0  
The increasing population i s  creating a constant food problem. · 
According to an estimate, "food production has increased from 9 .4 million 
tons in 1961 to 1 cro�e 30 lakh tons in 1976 but per capita food avail­
ability has dropped from 1 6 . 5  ounces to 14 ounces per person per day . 111 1  
This is because the growth rate of population has outpaced the production 
of food. This food problem is the most dominant problem of politics and 
economics . The main issue in Bangladesh politics is food. The success of 
a government depends on how effectively it can feed the people without any 
hunger . 
The increasing population is also creating widespread unemployment 
leading to dysfunctional elements in the political system. Being unemployed 
these people have nothing to do but resort to sabotage and disorder. That 
is the main reason for the rise of radical political parties which take 
advantage o f  these d isgruntled elements . It is likely that with the pre-
sent rate o f  increase o f  population, there will be 8 to 20 million unem-
ployment by the end of the century . Bangladesh has 30 percent unemployment 
l Oibid . ,  p .  93 . 
1 1 Ibid . ' p .  9 5 .  
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which is a constant threat to political and social stability. By 2000, 
12  
with 30 percent of the population unemployed , there will be great danger . 
The urban migration is also creating the problem of socio-political 
stability. While the bulk of the Bengali population is in rural areas , 
there is a persistent trend towards urbanization and more recently this 
phenomenon has accelerated . A National Quarterly sample survey conducted 
by the central statistical office of the erstwhile government of Pakistan 
in 1967-68 revealed that 5 . 97 percent of the total urban Bengalese popula­
tion of age 1 0  years and above had migrated within the preceeding year . 13  
Information on the reasons which motivated such rural to urban 
migration was:.collected :by this survey. 
TABLE 3 
Reasons Given by Rural Population Who Migrated 
to the Urban Areas : 1967-68 
Reasons for Rural-Urban Proportion of Total Migrants 
Migration of Age : IO and . Above 
To seek job 
To set up industry 
or business 
To study 
To marry 
Others 
3 9 . 37 
4 . 07 
0 .90 
10.41  
45 . 25 
Source: Iftikhar Ahmed , "Employment in Bangladesh: Problems and 
Prospects,"  in A .  G .  Robinson, and K .  Griffin, The Economic Development 
of Bangladesh Within a Socialist Framework (New York : John Wiley & Sons , 
1974 , p .  252 . 
It  is clear from the survey that in Bangladesh almost two-fifths of the 
total migrants of age 1 0  and above who migrated into the urban areas were 
1 2rbid . '  p .  98 . 
13 
lftikhar Ahmed , "Employment in Bangladesh , "  in Economic Develop-
ment of Bangladesh, p .  7 9 .  
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looking for work. These migrants are readily persuaded to political vio-
lence or extrem.ism . They are very much attracted by the radical parties 
14 to create disturbance within the coun�ry. 
Another problem which threatens the security of Bangladesh is 
widespread corruption in every sector. The development plan is very much 
hampered by this kind of corruption. Whatever money is allocated is not 
utilized. More than half of the money is wasted on undue bribes . There 
is widespread hierarchy and red tapism within the administration. This 
gives the officials a chance to take bribes . The politicians are also 
corrupt. Corruption may alienate modarn""Oriented civil servants and cause 
them to leave the country or withdraw or reduce their efforts .  In addi-
tion to the obvious costs, this may involve considerable opportunity costs 
in the form of restriction of governmental programs because of fears that 
a new program might be ineffective in practice. 
Industrialization is backward . The industrial production contri-
buted only 8 percent to the gross domestic product . The government has 
established certain projects that are inadequately prepared a�d vested , 
sometimes through political involvement by overstaff ing of unskilled labor 
and sometimes using traditional administrative services in the management 
proces s .  In general, Bangladesh has experienced great difficulty in raising 
resources to cover current budgetary expenditures and to provide for that 
part of the small development programs . 
"The budget of 1975-76 was the first to show 
a comfortable surplus on the current account . 
This surplus amounts to only $100 million at 
14Ibid . ,  p .  80 . 
the current exchange rate. But this money is 
quite insufficient for long-term development 
programs . 11 15 
1 05 
All these problems cannot be solved unless the basic problem of 
establishing a stable government is solved. The first task is to carry 
out the difficult and painstaking task of improving the machinery of 
administration, training people to operate it, and giving incentive , hope 
and leadership needed to do this . The following development scenatio · can 
be presented. (See Table 4 , following page . )  
The economic condition of Bangladesh improved significantly in 
197 5.:from the totally dismal pie ture that had prevailed in 197 4 .  
"By January 1975 the price of rice had risen by 
500 percent over the 1969-70 level . By July the 
price came down by 300 percent . From July to 
September the price of rice fell by another 37 
percent and the cost of living index fell by 9 
percent.  During the same period the money supply 
declined by 3 . 5  percent and bank deposits by 5 . 6  
percent .111 6 
The military regime under the leadership of General Zia has been 
particularly successful in the economic field. The government discarded 
the socialist pretensions of the Mujib regime and took special measures 
to boost private foreign trade and private investment in the industrial 
sector. Private foreign and indigenous traders entered into the formerly 
nationalized jute trade. Some of the nationalized industries were given 
over to the private entrepreneurs. A ceiling of Taka 20 million fixed by 
the Mujib government for private investment was raised to Ta�a 100 million. 
15Jaast Faaland , and J .  R. Parkinson, �· cit . ,  p .  93.  
16 
Montgomery and Siffins , Approaches to Politics, Development and 
Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Co . ,  1967) , p .  20 . 
TABLE 4 
Development Scenario 1975-2000 
A. Population and Major Accounts Magnitudes 
Population (millions) 
Gross Domestic Product (millions) 
Gross Investment (millions) 
Net Capital Import (millions) 
Domestic Savings Per Capita 
Consumption (millions) 
Gross Product Per Capita (millions) 
Consumption Per Capita (millions) 
Domestic Savings Per Capita (millions) 
Gross Investment Per Capita GDP 
Capital Import Percent of  GDP 
Domestic Savings Percent of  GDP 
B.  Annual Growth Rates and 
25-Year Growth Index 
Population 
Gross Domestic Product 
Gross Investment 
Gross Product Per Capita 
Consumption Per Capita 
C .  Selected Ratios 
Capital-Output Ratio 
Marginal Overall Savings 
Rate (percent) 
Marginal Per Capita 
Savings Rate 
1 975/80 
3 . 0  
5 . 0  
1 7 . 4  
2 . 0  
0 . 6  
(2 . 0) 
(28) 
(62) 
1980/85 
2 . 8  
6 . 0  
1 0 . 0  
3 . 1  
2 . 5  
2 . 7  
1 5  
32 
1975 
80 
6400 
550 
800 
250 
6650 
80 
83 
-3 
8 
12  
-4 
1980 
93 
8 1 7 0  
1225 
980 
245 
7925 
88 
85 
3 
15  
12  
3 
1985/90 
2 . 6  
. 60 
6 . 0  
3 . 3  
2 . 9  
3 . 0  
14 
24 
1985 
106 
10930 
1965 
1 3 1 0  
655 
10275 
103 
97 
6 
18 
12  
6 
1990/95 
2 . 3  
6 . 0  
6 . 0  
3 . 6  
3 . 2  
3 . 0  
16 
20 
1990 
1 2 1  
14630 
2635 
1465 
1 1 70 
13460 
1 2 1  
1 1 1  
10  
18 
10 
8 
1995/2000 
2 . 0  
6 . 0  
6 . 0  
3 . 8  
3 . 3  
3 . 0  
14 
22 
1995 
136 
19610 
3530 
1570 
1960 
17650 
145 
130 
15 
18 
8 
10  
1980/2000 
2 . 4  
6 . 0  
7 . 0  
3 . 5  
3 . 0  
3 . 0  
16 
21  
2000 
150 
26140 
4 7 1 0  
1570 
3140 
2300 
1 74 
153 
2 1  
18 
6 
12 
Total 
Growth 
Index 
1975/2000 
187 
401 
855 
218  
184 
n . a .  
n . a .  
n . a .  
Source: Jaast Faaland , and J .  R .  Parkinson , Bangladesh : The Test Case for Development (Colorado : 
Westview, 1976) . 
-
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To attract foreign investment, the government announced the policy of 
non-nationalization and tax holiday for all new induntrien and home 
remittance of net profits by foreign companies. The effect of these 
policies has been a marked improvement in the private sector. "As 
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against the total investment of Taka 200 . 9  million in the two financial 
years of 1973-74 and 1974-75, there was a total private investment of 
1 7  
Taka 850 . 9  million in the financial year 1975-76 . "  
The government launched a massive program of manual digging and 
creation of canals and the building of roads and embankments under a 
work for food program. By November 1976,  2 , 200 miles of embankment and 
900 miles of road had been constructed and 2 , 200 miles of new canals 
excavated. Lastly, the government appointed 1 2 , 000 family planning 
officers thoughout the. country to popularize the family planning pro­
gram. The government has also been successful in checking smuggling 
across the border. The cumulative effect of the government policies 
has resulted in a marked improvement in all fields of the Bangaldesh 
economy . "Both the annual reports of the Bangladesh Bank and the World 
Bank, 1975-76,  revealed that gross domestic product rose by 1 1 . 4  percent 
in 1975-76, as against 2 percent the preceeding year. The overall cost 
of living index was estimated to have declined by 20 percent during the 
year as a against a rise of 3 1  percent during 1974-75. Industrial output 
increased by 5 percent and for the first time since liberation, the pro­
duction of the all important jute industry went up by 7 . 3  percent . The 
export target fixed at Taka 5540 million in 1975-76 was exceeded by Taka 
1 7rhe Bangladesh Observer , September 26 , 1978.  
560 million. The improving trends in the economy showed acceleration 
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in the first quarter of the financial year 1976-77,  particularly in the 
export sector, which increased by 48 percent over the corresponding 
period in 1975-76 . " 18 
The economy does not look so good compared to 1976.  A growth 
rate of 3 percent is estimated for the year compared to 9 . 7  percent dur-
ing the previous year . The decline in the growth rate has been attributed 
to the short fall in the agricultural sector. Food grains production in 
1977 was estimated to be short by about one million tons from the target 
of 43 million tons. Excessive rain and f loods caused this decline. The 
industrial output increased because of a higher production of sugar , 
fertilizer, cement , paper, and other product s .  
"The hig�light o f  the 1977-78 budget could be summarized as follows : 
(a) total revenue income Taka 1 1 , 560 million (official exchange rate is 
approximately $ 1  = Taka 1 5 . 50) ; (b) total expenditure Taka 20, 960 million 
on development and Taka 400 million for food and work programs; (c) an 
anticipated growth rate of 7 percen t ;  (d) agricultural sector projected 
to grow by 8 percent, industrial sector by 7 percent and other by 9 per-
cent. The investment climate in the private sector looks favorable for 
the first time since 1972 as the government went ahead with its policy of 
encouraging entrepreneurs, both at home and abroad . There was no indica-
tion of further nationalization and the National Investmet Board opened 
18Philip M. Hauser, "Some Cultural and Personal Characteristics 
of the Less Developed Areas , "  in Finkle and Gable (eds . ) ,  Political 
Development and Social Change (New York : John Wiley & Sons, Inc . ,  1968) , 
p .  5 6 .  
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new industrial units for private investment . About 200 smaller indus-
tries were denationalized by the government and returned to the private 
sector. 11 19 
Although Bangladesh is far from achieving self-suf ficiency in 
food there are indications of serious efforts to achieve this goal. 
Rural development received top priority in 1977 and substantial inter-
national aid was promised to increase agriculturpl productivity. The 
program of Swanirvar (self-sufficiency) was launched in selected areas 
to improve agriculture through voluntary labor offered by the villagers. 
Zia was impressed by the showpiece of this program at Ulashi in Jes� 
sore district and urged the villagers to follow the spirit of develop-
ment through self-reliance throughout the country . 
Related to economic problems are the social problems . Social 
problems are to politics and economics . As Regen mentions, "politi.c.al 
development also means the change of traditional values . In exploring 
the possibilities for a framework for analyzing economic and political 
development ,  Regen takes account of deep-seated resistance to social 
change and of the need for changing some rather basic attitudes if 
development is to succeed. 1120 
The main problem in Bangladesh is mass illiteracy. The literacy 
rate in the country was up by 4 . 4  percent in 1974 compared to that in 
1 96 1 .  The literacy rate now stands at 24 . 3  percent . The urban literacy 
1 9Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1976:  Struggle for Sur­
vival as an Independent State," Asian Survey, VII , February 1 9 7 7 .  
20Montgomery and Siffins, Approaches to Politics, Development 
and Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Co . ,  1967 ) ,  p .  2 3 .  
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rate o f  4 4 . 0  percent i s  almost double than that o f  rural areas . . Males 
have a higher literacy rate than females which stands at 32 . 9  percent 
and 1 4 . 3  percent, respectively. Due to the lack of education people 
are not socialized to national goals and ideology. They are not 
invovled in the national political culture. 
In the developing societies the Bangladesh political sphere is 
not sharply differentiated from the spheres of social and personal rela­
tions. Among the most powerful influences of the traditional order in 
any society in transition is the survival of a pattern of politcal rela­
tionship largely determined by the pattern of social and personal rela­
t ions with the inevitable result that the political struggle tends to 
revolve around issues of prestige, influence and even of personalities 
and not around questions of alternative courses of policy action. 
The elite who dominate the national politics of most non-Western 
countries generally represents a remarkably homogeneous group in terms of 
educational experience and social background . 
At the village level it is even more difficult to distinguish a 
distinct political sphere. The social status of the individual and his 
personality largely determines his political behavior a�d the range of 
his influence, a condition which places severe limits on the effective­
ness of anyone.:who came from thet6utside to perform a political role , be it 
that of an administrative agent of the national government or of a repre­
sentative of a national party. Political discussion tends rather to assume 
the form of either intracommunal debate or the attempt of one group to 
justify its position toward another . 
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The lack of a clearly differentiated political sphere means that 
political parties tend to be clearly oriented not to a distinct political 
arena but to some aspect of the communal framework of politics. In reflect­
ing the communal base of politics they tend to represent total ways of 
life; attempts to organize parties in terms of particular political prin­
ciples or limited policy objectives generally result either in failure or 
in the adoption of a broad ethic which soon obscures the initial objective. 
Usually political parties represent some sub-society or simply the person­
ality of a particularly influential individual. 
Despite the impact of colonization and the presence of a united 
veneer of Western technology and culture, the mass population have in the 
main retained their traditional values . The ingredients of the value sys­
tem are in apparent conflict with the new national aspirations for econ­
omic advancement .  For example, some o f  the cultural elements which appear 
to be in conflict with technological development and the attainment of 
higher levels of living are: the emphasis on spiritual rather than mate­
rial values ; the stress laid on the importance of afterlife or future 
existence; the pressure for conformance with an oftern intolerance with 
deviations from traditional patterns of thought and action, the relatively 
rigid definitions of roles of members of the family, the village and the 
social order at large, the parochialism of the diverse radical, ethnic , 
linguistic and territorial groups,  the familistic orientation, the tend­
ency to place savings in traditional channels of investments , including 
non-productive investments like j ewels and precious stones and the allo­
cation of relatively large amounts of life-space and energy to traditional 
cultural and religious rituals, ceremonies and festivals. 
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The traditional value systems do not provide the population 
with incentive for material gain or expectations of advancement based 
on merit and application. The prestige vocations and occupations t end 
to be those in government , religion , and agriculture, not the type of 
occupations identified with economic development . That is,  occupations 
in commerce, industry and many of the professions and the services have 
yet to achieve prestige and attract competent people. Moreover, the 
traditional value systems do not provide the person with general orien­
tation of the type necessary in a monetary as distinguished from a sub­
sistence economy , including conceptions of work as a segmente.P area of 
activity requiring a fixed time , place, and an employer-employee nexus. 
Very rigid stratification exists in the society. It undoubtedly 
has an adverse effect on individual incentive conducive to economic 
advance. It tends to restrict the access of persons with ability to 
education, training and opportunity consonant with effective utilization 
of human resources. There is a widespread tendency to restrict education, 
technical training, and the better vocational opportunities to members of 
the elite. In consequence,  such limited opportunities as exist for train­
ing, both domestically and abroad , through various scholarships,  fellow­
ships and technical assistance programs are of ten made available on a 
nepotistic, familial, village, ethnic, religious or personal basis rather 
than strictly on merit . 
There is a tendency to place a great premium on age. Seniority 
is often a maj or · basis for status and prestige. The older person is 
regarded as a repository of the experience and knowledge of society and 
is treated with the utmost respect and deference. The privileges and 
priorities of seniority are in the main rigidly fixed and rarely 
impaired. This is particularly in evidence in those nations in which 
a government civil service has been established . A younger man must 
wait his turn for advancement. Greater competence on his part or 
incompetence on the part of a senior officer is rarely an adequate 
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basis for the replacement of an older by a younger person. As a resul t ,  
the scarcity o f  skilled human resources t o  which reference has been made 
above is of ten made even more acute by the inability of the culture to 
tilize such skills as are available. 
"Among the mass population ' s  adherence to ancient tradition and 
superstitious ways of ten directly interfers with economic advancement., wide­
spread beliefs, fears, inhibitions and behaviorisms generated by living 
in a universe deemed to be controlled by astrological , numerological and 
economic advance and a general orientation prepared to accept the method­
ology and fruits of sciencel 1 These socio-economic problems create prob­
lems in the execution of any new policy which is a very important part of 
political development .  
Bangladesh, as a society, fits within the trasitional stage; the 
societal structure is not purely traditonal or modern . The socialization 
process is not very modernized. Still the family and other inner insti­
tutions play a great par t .  Political roles are based on ascription rather 
than achievement .  The political leaders are j udged on the basis of their 
family background rather than on achievement. People are apathetic to 
general welfare activities. They devote much time ln useless discussion 
rather than constructive work. The conununication process is face to face 
rather than organized. Bad conununication systems alienate people from the 
2 1Philip M. Hauser, ££.· cit . 
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decision-making process. People are still attracted to the tradit ional 
values.  For example, obedience to religion, to seniors and aristocrats, 
more values to men than women . They worship personality rather than 
institutions. All the characters of the transitional society are existing 
in Bangladesh. As a result of these, any developmental plan faces resist­
ence from the society. 
The values are changing very fast in the cities. But in the 
villages, the changes are very slow. It creates problems because the 
majority of the population lives in the villages. The elites values are 
often misunderstood by the populace . For instance, the theory of secular­
ism advocated by Sheikh Muj ib was misinterpreted by the people who inter­
preted secularism as no religion. As 80 percent of the population are 
Muslims, they could not appreciate secularism as an ideology . They 
regarded it as an opposition to Islam and a blow to the tradition of 
Islamic philosophy. 
But the problem lies with the lack of connnunication. The new 
values can be implanted in the minds of the people by better communication 
media. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been mentioned in the introductory chapter political 
development is a very comprehensive concept . Since it is very broad 
in application its problems are also many . The preceding chapter ana­
lyzes the problems of political development in Bangladesh. An analysis 
of the preceding chapter will show that Bangladesh is still facing the 
problem of integration. The regional disparity between the north and 
south.. has compelled the government to take certain steps for the satis­
faction of the needs of · the northern people .  Politics is becoming very 
much regionalized. The tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts are 
demanding provincial autonomy in their area. They are also demanding 
the preservation of their own culture and values . Bad communication sys­
tems have alienated the tribal people from the rest of the population. 
Following the definition of Myron Weiner , Bangladesh is still facing the 
problem with regard to elite-mass integration, value integration. There 
is a wide gap between the elites and the mass . As such1 there is a gap 
between the input and output sector of the political system. The mass 
cannot communicate their demands to the elites who are also unable to edu­
cate the people in policy implementation. In matters of national ideology , 
Bangladesh is still in search of one which can unify the people. The indi­
cation of these problems rightly establishes the hypothesis that there is 
the problem of national integration in Bangladesh. 
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The precarious problem which Bangladesh is facing is the problem 
of stability and unity. As Chapter III shows , soon after the creation of 
Bangladesh, there was complete disorder and instability. Inter-group and 
intra-group conflicts characterize the political situation. Within a few 
years different types of government came into being. People are not sure 
of the form of government . The existing government is also facing the 
problem of establishing legitimate authority. The rising expectations 
caused rising frustrations creating instability. The recalcitrant groups 
are busy in creating turmoil within the country . The radical parties 
resort to violence rather than finding any constitutional channel for the 
solution of the problem. The government is frequently shaken by revolts 
by different group s .  All these pictures come very close to our hypothesis 
that the problem of political development in Bangladesh is hindered by the 
problem of stability and unity. 
Chapter V .· · shows that Bangladesh is characterized by many politi­
cal parties , none of which are organized to attract a large following . The 
parties lack organization at the grass roots level . The party structure is 
based on the personality of a single leader. There is no coherent ideology 
beh.ind the parties . Even within the parties, factional conflicts threaten 
the very stability of the country . The radical parties are engaged in 
underground .. politics indulging in sabotage and disorder. This hampers the 
healthy growth of any political institutions . The lack of a well-organized 
party also stands in the way of national unity . People are factionalized 
on the basis of party . 
Chapter IV establish.es the problem of the bureaucracy in Bangla­
desh. It inherited the system of the British administration, which trained 
the bureaucracy in the art of control rather than direction o f  policy 
initiatives . This tradition of the bureaucracy hampered the growth of 
the formal political institutions . After the liberation the negative 
1 1 7  
role o f  the bureaucracy also created a problem because the bureaucracy 
lacked the initiative in administration. This created a problem in 
administration which was needed very badly in a new-born state. To make 
a balance in the role of the bureaucracy is a serious problem. Upperhand 
in any way creates problems . After the eomiµg of Ziaur Rahman, the bureau­
cracy again gained the upperhand . It has created problems in t�e growth of 
the political institutions . As such, we see the essay rightly confirms the 
view that the problem of making a balance in the role of the bureaucracy 
does exist .  
The most dominant problem is the socio-economic problem .  The 
problem o f  population, unemployment and low productivity creates growing 
frustration among the peopl e .  In the preceding chapters we see the main 
cause of the prevailing instability is the failure o f  the government to 
solve the economic problems like population , increase in the price index, 
etc. The essay clearly states population and other socio-economic problems 
lie at the root of all political problems . The traditional values and way 
of life are also ingrained in the people who obstruct the peaceful way of 
change o f  modernization. An analysis of the socio-economic problems of 
Bangladesh rightly establishes our hypothesis that the most precarious 
problem which hinders political development is the problem of economic 
development . 
Analyzing different problems we find that Bangladesh is seriously 
facing the problem of political development . Of course, these problems 
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are not peculiar only i n  Bangladesh . All the developing countries are 
suffering from these problems . The problem is very acute in Bangladesh, 
which is a new-born country. Bangladesh is itself the · creation of the 
problem of integration which creates problems in the developing countries . 
The birth of Bangladesh has created a kind of separatist tendency among 
the disgruntled elements . Politics have become regionalized . The tribal 
people of Chittagong Hill Tracts , taking account of their underdevelopment 
compared to other parts of the country , are demanding provincial autonomy 
for themselves citing the example of Sheikh Mujib who demanded provincial 
autonomy for the then East Pakistan on the basis of a six-point formula .  
The tribal people also try t o  base their demands b y  citing the separate 
culture and traditions of the people .  I f  the government does not take 
effective steps for the satisfaction of their problems , one day it may 
lead to further problems threatening the security of the country . The 
main problem is due to the lack of communication between the tribal people 
and the other people .  Because of the bad communication system they cannot 
come into contact with the rest of the population. They should be encour­
aged to participate in national politics. Because of the lack of partici­
pation their demands remain unheard and unredressed. 
Though solutions are very difficult we can suggest some policy 
recommendations by giving due attention to the problems . As the majority 
of the people l ive in the villages , steps should be taken for integrated 
rural development . Unemployment in the villages , whether partial , seasonal 
or disguised , is widespread and efforts to uplift the rural areas by finding 
more employment for the people should get top priority. The cultivation of 
land has almost reached the saturation point in most parts of the country 
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and while the increasing of productivity is rightly get d.ng full at ten-
tion, the scope of employment in agriculture is limited . 
Ways and means , therefore, have to be evolved· to absorb the sur-
plus manpower in the villages in gainful subsidiary occupations . The pre-
sent government has laid emphasis on creating more employment opportunities 
and exercises are presently going on to explore all possible avenues to 
ahcieve this end . Augmentation of employment potential in the rural sector 
requires a multi�pr.qnged approach. 
"The strategy of the government for the purpose includes the 
setting up of small-scale industries all over the rural areas on a massive 
scale which will , of course,  require huge investment and a gigantic train­
ing program . 111 For this , involvement of institutions like parks and indus-
trial houses , is of prime necessity . In addition, cottage industries and 
village hand icrafts are also to be encouraged in every way and markets should 
be explored for them . 
Rural employment is an important issue which calls for urgent atten-
tion not only of the development planners but of all governments throughout 
the world , particularly in the developing countries . The present government 
has assigned top priority to the program of rural development. According to 
the goals defined , every able-bodied person should be provided with gainful 
employment within the next few years . It is undoubtedly the most challenging 
task. Its fulfillment would naturally call for all out efforts on the part 
of all segments of our society. 
1Mumtaz Khanam, "Integrated Rural Development ," The Bangladesh 
Observer , August 1 4 ,  1978.  
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The most fundamental problem is illiteracy, which is blocking 
the smooth running of the country . Education lies at the root of all · 
problems . Instability, disunity, factionalism, and lack of an organized 
party all are beset with the problem of illiteracy. Education is an 
urgent necessity. It is necessary for implanting values, tolerance and 
national political cultures . Unless people are educated to national poli-
tical ideology and political culture of the country no attempt at political 
stabilization, economic development or unity will be successful . .  
Bangladesh needs to undertake ambitious plans and programs for 
attaining self-reliance in every stage of her economy as early as possible. 
The undertaking and execution of development plans and programs needs the 
development of the executive skills . The success of any program depends 
on the successful performance of the executives .  Such executive skill 
should be developed , but this does not mean that this development of skill 
will supercede other development of the nation. The development strategies 
of executive skills should be well. assessed to give room to every eligible 
one for the nation-building task. Abdur Rashid Khan in his article, Develop-
ment Strategies for Executive Skills , gave certain suggestions : 
1 .  He should be imbided with the spirit of 
nationalism and be dispirited with the 
feelings of self-interest . 
2 .  His thought and expression in national 
interest should be well-evaluated to get 
9ptimum service from him. 
3 .  His expertise in the respective field of 
work should be well renumerated for maximum · 
utilization. 
4 .  He should be given incentives for his higher 
efficiency and productivity in performance .  
5.  He should be encouraged for his constructive 
thinking and expression in national interest.  
6 .  He should be given room to pass any con­
structive comment for improvement of any 
policy which he is to implement , if there 
is any hinderance in the course of execution. 
7 .  His power of motivation in getting the work 
done by others properly should be accounted 
for to his credit . 
8 .  There should be a spirit of fair competition 
in developing executive skills . 
9 .  He should be affixed with a definite respons­
ibility to make him more cautious and responsible 
to the nation. 2 
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But there should be checks and balances in the growth of the exe-
cutive skills which may j eopardize other development works . 
For rural development , the most urgent necessity is the development 
of the local government. Local bodies should be given more power because 
it is the true representative of the people. The representatives of the 
local bodies are very much attached to local nP.ed s .  This will lessen the 
bureaucratic dominance of administration. �ery recently , President Ziaur 
Rahman reiterated, 
"The government ' s  firm det- ermination to decentral­
ize administrative machinery and delegate more power 
to the local government for a rapid and unhindered 
economic development.  He also emphasized the greater 
role for the Thana Committee and Union Parishad 
(council) . "3 
There is also the need f 6r the reorganization of the Thana admini-
stration which should be based on the peoples ' representatives . The local 
officials know better about the needs and demands of the local people and 
there is another psychological reason that the local officials will have a 
profound and si.ncere desire to develop his own area and as a common conse-
2 Abdur Rashid Khan, "Development Strategies for Executive Skills , "  
The Bangladesh Observer , Sept-ember 1 9 ,  1978.  
3The Bangladesh Observer , September 1 ,  1978.  
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quence of it he will work for the local people more and more effectively 
and wholeheartedly . It is also supposed that the local officials will be 
able to motivate and mobilize the local people more effectively and ef fi­
ciently. The biggest reason for which this attempt of the government 
deserves our praise is that there are many more channels of more and more 
efficient and effective administration if the local officials work in close 
collaboration with the local representatives and local people. Because the 
complete administration at the Thana level will be conducted by the local 
people, the Thana administration will be able to work as a self-government 
which will add a stupendous and glorious chapter in the history of local 
self-government in Bangladesh. In order to establish the Thana administra­
tion as a local self-government unit we are in great need of reorganizing 
the Thana ·Council s .  
Very recently the government has declared another plan t o  form a 
Thana Development Committee in every Thana from the next financial year . 
For the proper development in every sphere of life well-planned and well­
organized activities are essentially needed. The people have to be mobil­
ized so that the.y can spontaneously take part in the development activities 
and in an organized way; the manpower should be utilized so that the best 
possible achievement can be made to accomplish these objectives . To esta­
blish the Thana Development Committee we should first of all abolish the 
existing Thana Council and a Thana Development Committee should be formed 
in its place by taking peoples ' representatives who would be elected dir­
ectly by the people. In this way people are encouraged to participate in 
national politics . 
There is also the need of proper village leadership. Without 
leadership no organized goals, functions or aims can be achieved. Strong 
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well-organized and well-knitted leadership will ensure fruitful and far-
reaching results.  If  leadership becomes weak, flexible and oscillating 
total · expectations of the desired goals might be frustrated . As develping 
the nation ' s  economy is based on agriculture, leadership in the village 
areas is the prime concern for all. Because leadership in the village 
areas means strong guidance in the field of agriculture, husbandry, cott-
age industry, etc. that ultimately increases GNP and thus standardize 
national life both internally and externally. 
If we look at the villages of Bangladesh, we find leadership in 
village areas primarily originates from the following sources : (1)  Village 
Mohajans , (2) Matbai:s.,.:··:.(3)1· .?.J:ra�itional families (middle class) . Of them, 
village Mohaj ans and Matbars are permanent village dwellers who merely know 
the problems of the village but most of whom have no educational qualifica-
tion and hence their understanding the conception of democracy, cooperatives , 
4 
etc . , are very primary. They capture village leadership due to their . 
increasing influence on poor peasant s ,  handicraftsmen, fishermen and others 
because they hold vast land , a large sum of money and capital. By their 
power and wealth, they can easily motivate the poor people at their own 
interests. Further , it is found that allegiance to Mohajans and Matbars 
is created through generatio� after generation. With these advantages 
leadership in Mohajans and Matbars has become arbitrary against which poor 
villagers cannot do anything because of thinking of .their�sole dependence 
or �ubsistence on them . 
4 Sinha M. A. Sayeed , "Leadership in Village Development , "  The 
Bangladesh Observer , February 1 2 ,  1978.  
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But the danger of this type of leadership is that as Mohajans 
and Matbars are generally not educated, cultured or well-infor:r.ed of 
national development and problems , they become highly dependent on others . 
Further , the input of the political system, i . e . , poljtical socilaization, 
political recruitment , interest articulation, aggregation and political com-
' 
munication, cannot be well-spread and well-rooted under this type of leader-
ship . 
On the other hand , the traditional and middle class leadership 
are well-educated and conscious.  The political system may work well if 
they take vigorous steps to make: .tb'e::policy of government a success . 
The programs of the present government have ushered great hopes 
and enthusiasm among the peopl e ,  especially the villagers . But if leader-
ship in village areas is not constructive and benevolent , developmental 
schemes wirlnot materialize. Extension of the banking system ,  emphasis 
on cottage industry , agricultural development , adequate credits to peasants 
and other facilities should be extended to rural areas in order to hasten 
the ' process: of�.dev�l�pmental activities . 
(a) Leadership in village areas should be formed 
in such a way so that all types of personalities 
may take part in molding society; 
(b) In case of leadership of the middle class it 
should ask proper help from Mohajans, Matbars and 
others . Similarly, Matbars and Mohajans should 
extend their helping hands towards any develop­
mental schemes . 
(c) Village politics that create a hinderance to 
development should be brought to play their · 
role in a constructive way and thus make develop­
ment a success . 
{d) Educationists, doctors, engineers and other pro­
fessionals should go to villages which greatly helps 
to create strong leadership in village development , 
because leadership is the product of environment also . 
(e) Growing educated young generations may play 
a very positive role in this field. With 
stable and constructive development the 
village people will be able to have the 
fruits of political development . 5 
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Efforts should be made for the control of corruption which ravages 
every sector of the society. Developmental programs are very much hampered 
due to the widespread corruption. The present government has taken certain 
steps in this respec t .  For example ,  
Post-Bangladesh public ·leaders will have to submit 
their property statements within 60 days from January 
25 to the coordination control cell for national security. 
Persons failing to submit the statement shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term of up to two years and may 
also be disqualified for election or appointment to a 
public off ice for a period from five to seven years 
under the public leaders.  ( Improper Acquisition of 
Property : Reg{!iation. 1 977-MLR x of 1977) 
But mere control of the public officials will not solve the prob-
lem unless· efforts :are taken·_ to cbntrol .it .. in �every sector, especially the 
bureaucracy, the police, the businessmen. It is really difficult to control 
all these sectors. This can be controlled by peopl e ' s  participation. Peo-
ple should be vigilant to find out the corrupt elements and report to the 
authority concerned . 
Exports should be diversified. Efforts should be taken for the 
increase of exports. President Ziaur Rahman called for creating a produc-
tion base that would enable the country to offer different::products , both 
primary and manufactured for export to the world market. 
6The Bangladesh. Observer , September 4 ,  1978 . 
The export earnings during 1976-77 reached the figure of Taka 
625 . 50 crore as against Taka 306 . 14 crore in 1974-75 and Taka 551 . 67 
crore in 1975-7 6 .
7 
This rise is no doubt encouraging but there is no 
room for complacency as we have to pay about three times our export 
earnings for making the payments on a heavy import bill on account of 
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the import of capital goods,  machinery , raw materials and consumer goods.  
These are some guidelines for the solution of the problems . But 
the actual solution of the problems is very difficult . Unless society is 
stabilized , no plan or solution of the problems will be successful. Steps 
should be taken for the stabilization of the society. 
7 
Sinha M. A .  Sayeed, "Road to Development," The Bangladesh 
Observer , September 1 2 ,  1978 . 
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